Genocide in Bosnia-Hercegovina: A Short History

Thomas White works with the Cohen Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies in Keene, New Hampshire. twhite@keene.edu

Hikmet Karčić is with the Institute for Islamic Tradition of Bosniaks, Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina. karcic@iitb.ba

Overview

This is the history of an ideological narrative of grievance, of one group’s superiority and possible “replacement” by inferior “others;” political leaders who develop a cult of followers by championing that narrative; the leveraging of media to build alternate truths; the spreading of hatred and escalation of racial violence through nationalist militias; the undermining of checks and balances of the federation of Republics; divisive nationalist identities, and corruption. In 1990, as Yugoslavia collapsed, the first multiparty elections were held. These elections created nationalist parties intent on perpetuating ethno-national identities and causes. By 1992, war was being imposed through Serbian and Croatian nationalists who were seeking to expanded into “greater” national territory. In the coming years the perpetrators of “ethnic cleansing,” displacement, mass atrocity, and genocide, were rewarded by the international community at the Dayton Accords in 1995. Dayton ended the war, but then imposed an ethno-nationalistic portioned Bosnia. Three separate post conflict narratives (Serb, Croat, Bosniak) were reinforced by institutionally and in collective memory. A “tycoon class” of nationalist leaders continues to enrich themselves through corruption supported by poverty, fear, insecurity, and the promotion of divisive ethnic identities.

The hate didn’t exist before; it was artificially installed. It was all so unbelievable that at first, it seemed funny…The emphasis on ethnicity and exclusion was so strong that ethnic hatred became normalized…There is also the ideology of religion and nationality…Never has there been more religion and less faith…National and religious identities are openly used as weapons in the political arsenal.”
– Vedran Grahovac, Prijedor (Lippman, 2019, p. 215)

Denial of Bosnian genocide is rooted in Serb and Croat religious nationalism and Islamophobia

Unresolved and manipulated memory continue to haunt the Balkans. It is a fundamental mistake, however, to accept the narrative of “Balkanization” as an intractable “truth” of people living here. Balkanization implies that people are separated by exclusive group identities that make them prone to war and to live in perpetual hostility. This construct is a relatively recent development articulated by 19^th century nationalism and reinforced during and after the world wars by corrupt leaders. One of the difficulties in learning about what happened here in the 1990s is realizing that this narrative was/is used to not only promote exclusive ethnic identities and destroy the multiethnic and pluralistic identities of Bosnia; it was/is also accepted as the justification for the world to turn away. Accepting a construct such as “Balkanization” reduces our understanding of what was and is possible. There are competing tensions between exclusive nationalism as well as the opposite, a respectful sharing of multi-ethnic and multicultural identities. This essay should be read as an opening to further reading and inquiry.

The Sarajevo Haggadah

Jews and Muslims share a history of targeting and persecution in the Balkans. In 1492, King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella expelled Jews and Muslims from the newly unified kingdom of Spain. During the expulsion Sephardic (Spanish) Jews escaped with a Haggadah (an illuminated manuscript contains the story of the Israelites’ Exodus from Egypt) that originated in Barcelona around 1350. It is one of the oldest Sephardic Haggadahs in the world. In the diaspora that followed, many Jews and Muslims migrated to Sarajevo (Lukic & Lynch, 1999). Sarajevo became a haven for interfaith culture where the Haggadah was revered and protected. Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo are proud that they had a hand in preserving the Haggadah from Spain with its tolerant, cosmopolitan culture.

In modern times, Muslims rescued this manuscript twice. In 1942, Sarajevo was under the heal of Nazi Germany and its ally, the Croatian Fascist Ustaše (led by Ante Pavelić). Pavelić wanted his new Croatian state to be “cleansed” of Jews and Serbs (Brooks, 2007). When Nazi general Johann Fortner (who commanded a vicious Croatian Fascist regiment known as the Black Legion) demanded that the manuscript be turned over, the National Museum’s chief librarian, Derviš Korkut, risked his life and smuggled the Haggadah out of Sarajevo. It was believed to have been hidden in a mosque. In 1992 during the Bosnian War, Serb forces besieged Sarajevo and shelled the national Museum intent on destroying the cultural heritage of Bosnia. The Haggadah was once again rescued by the city’s Muslim population. This interfaith multiculturalism is precisely what many nationalists abhor.

“Christoslavic” Serb Ideology

The creation of many modern national identities (ideas about who belongs and who does not) was a product of 19th century nationalism. The Serbian construction of a national identity focused on a minor battle in Kosovo on June 26, 1389 (Anzulovic, 1999). Serb intellectuals transformed the death of the historic Serb Prince Lazar (Lazarus) into a Christ-like myth representing the sacrifice, death, and resurrection of the Serb nation. Lazar was captured during the battle and before he was killed, he assassinated the sultan. This action became a guiding legend for the role of Serbs in their relationship with Slavic Muslims. Muslims were transformed in the Serb national narrative into “Turks,” the murderers of Lazar and the destroyers of Serbia. Muslims were seen as religious and race traitors, having “polluted” the Slavic “race” (Sells, 2007). The Serb narrative did not accept Muslim identity and saw Muslims as weak cowards who had rejected their Serb identity. Serb nationalism would seek to punish Muslims in perpetuity in ways that echo the deicide myth of Christianity that condemned all Jews in perpetuity for the death of Jesus. Both this deicide myth and the Serb myth would prove to have lethal consequences.

As part of the development of the Serbian national identity another myth was created that envisioned an ancient Serbia as a stable, uniform ethno-religious group. On June 28, 1892, St. Vitus Day became an official holiday in the Orthodox Church which allowed Serbs to reflect upon these new “truths.” “Christoslavic ideology” focused on the idea that a battle was looming to save Christian values and identity. It is coincidence that Bosnian Serb nationalist Gavrilo Princip sparked World War I when he assassinated the Archduke Franz Ferdinand on June 28, 1914. Although a pan Yugoslav thinker, Serb nationalists were able to claim Princip’s action (June 28) as Serbian. He is still revered as a hero in Serbia. Under Slobodan Milošević Slobodan (Serbian President, 1989-1997 and President of the “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,” 1997-2000) genocide would be distorted into a sacred act, a religious duty, worthy of communion and forgiveness of sins by a Church that would support this crusade.

Superordinate Identity: The Former Yugoslavia

Marshal Tito, the Communist partisan hero of World War II who defeated other militias and the Germans with Allied help, held Yugoslavia together amidst a history of political, economic, and cultural conflict, as well as ethnic tension. Yugoslavia was created after World War I in 1918. The formerly independent Kingdom of Serbia’s royal House became the Yugoslav dynasty. Serbs saw themselves as superior and felt that their sacrifices in World War I were underappreciated. In 1946, after World War II, it became the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1963, the country was renamed again as the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). The six socialist republics that made up the country were the Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. Serbia contained two Socialist Autonomous Provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo. These two provinces were removed from Serbia in an attempt to protect the rights of people where no clear ethnic majority existed (Banac, 1992).

Although people of the former Yugoslavia (except for Albanians) shared a Slavic identity, ethnoreligious identities, were problematic. Croats are Roman Catholic, Serbs are Orthodox Christians, and Bosniaks (a term adopted in 1993) are Muslims or those who identify as Bosnian. Tito subordinated these identities to the Yugoslavian (“land of the South Slavs”) vision of “Brotherhood and Unity.” Serbia, however, continued to control the national narrative in schools and cultural events. Tito ruled with an iron hand, especially through his secret police, and “Brotherhood and Unity” really meant suppressing national identity through “divide and rule” (Zwaan, 2012, p. 125).

In 1974, constitutional reform allowed for more regional national autonomy and decentralization. A collective presidency of eight provisional representatives and a federal government with little control over economic, cultural, and political policy was created. Serbia, resenting that Vojvodina and especially Kosovo remained autonomous, rejected decentralized, and were especially angered that the 1974 constitution recognized Muslims as an ethnicity for the first time. Until then, the only choice Muslims were given in Yugoslavia when selecting ethnicity was to declare themselves “undecided” (neopredjeljeni). Marshal Tito died in May 1980.

Destroying Multiethnic Culture: Manipulating Nationalism and Christianity

Long Description

This image is a map showing the ethnic distribution in the former Yugoslavia based on data from the 1991 census. The map is labeled with various countries, featuring Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and surrounding countries like Italy, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Greece. Regions within the former Yugoslavia are color-coded to depict ethnic majorities: Slovenia is highlighted in blue, Croatia in yellow, Bosnia and Herzegovina in green, Montenegro in brown, Macedonia in dark green, and Serbia in purple. The Kosovo and Vojvodina regions within Serbia are noted. A pie chart in the upper right corner details the demographic percentages of various ethnic groups in the region, with the largest segments being Serb (36.3%) and Croat (19.7%).
Transcribed Text:
Slovene Albanian Muslim Serb Croat Hungarian Macedonian Montenegrin Bulgarian Slovak No majority present Based on opstine data from 1991 census.
Pie chart demographic details:
Hungarian, 1.9%
Montenegrin, 2.5%
Yugoslav*, 5.4%
Macedonian, 5.9%
Albanian, 7.7%
Slovene, 7.8%
Muslim, 8.9%
Croat, 19.7%
Serb, 36.3%
Other, 3.9%
*Yugoslavs are those persons who listed themselves as such in the 1981 census. They are dispersed across the country.

 

In 1986 a Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU) advocated for the “complete national and cultural integrity of the Serbian people” and an end to ethnic Serb “victimization.” Serbs in Croatia in Kosovo were poor, and the populist nationalists claimed a conspiracy was underway to hush up and ignore the crimes being committed against Kosovar Serbs.

Slobodan Milošević, a Communist party leader in Serbia adopted the memorandum and engineered the takeover of the Serbian Communist Party. He began replacing provincial leaders and local politicians with loyalists under the guise of “reform” (the “anti-bureaucratic revolution”).

Slovenia was the first Republic to begin to break away from Yugoslavia after the death of Tito. Liberalization and democratic reforms increased its openings to the West. Milošević, began a campaign against Slovenia under the guise of a believer in “Yugoslav unity.” With control of the press, Milošević seized an opportunity to fulfill his own ambitions while also promoting the cause of Serb nationalism.

Milošević coordinated with supporters of Serb nationalism promoting a series of protests for “constitutional changes” while targeting opponents. He specifically targeted the communist leadership in Vojvodina, Montenegro, and Kosovo. The League of Communists of Serbia under Milošević began removing provincial leaders and local politicians and replaced them with Milošević loyalists in what became known as the “anti-bureaucratic revolution” (Silber & Little, 1996, p. 62). The West feared ethnic wars in the Balkans and as Milošević began to cement his power base. Western powers welcomed his narrative that he was only seeking to hold Yugoslavia together. Despite CIA warnings, they saw him as Tito’s successor. He began to devise a plan for an expansion of a “Greater Serbia” wrapped in reformist garb of “rescuing” Yugoslavia.

1989: Kosovo & Montenegro

It was Milošević’s wife Mirjana who suggested to him that, “The time has come to back Kosovo Serbs.” (Glaurdić, 2011, p. 22) In 1989 Milošević began a crackdown on Albanians (Muslims) living in Kosovo. Kosovar Albanians had been facing repression since 1981. Utilizing the Christoslavic national narrative of victimhood, the Serb media began to talk about an ‘international Muslim conspiracy with genocidal goals’ for Serbians living in Kosovo. This claim, by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, was supported by the Vatican and Germany (Sells, 2007).

On January 11, 1989, after two days of Serb-sponsored protest, the leadership of Montenegro stepped down. Serbs began to draft a new Yugoslavian constitution that would take away Kosovo autonomy and make it part of Serbia. On February 19, 1989, Kosovo miners went on hunger strike and much of the province joined the miners in protest (Magaš, 1993). The protest gained support in Slovenia and Croatia. On February 27, 1989, 1,500 federal police troops under Serbian leadership began a campaign of oppression of Kosovo Albanians. On February 28 Milošević blamed the strikes on popular Kosovar Albanian leader, Azem Vlasi and leaders of Slovenia. Belgraders took to the streets shouting, “We want weapons!! We’re going to Kosovo!” (Glaurdić, 2011, p. 38)

On March 9, more strikes and arrests mark the start of a long period of passive resistance by the ethnic Albanian majority before a guerrilla war broke out in 1998-99. On March 16, Lawrence Eagleburger stated: “There is no question in my mind that Milošević is in terms of economics a Western market-orientated fellow… [who] is playing on and using Serbian nationalism, which has been contained for many years, in part I think as an effort to force the central government to come to grips with some very rough economic problems.” (Glaurdić, 2011, p. 40)

On March 28, the Serb National Assembly ratified a new constitution after interrogating and threatening Albanian representatives. (Only 10 of the 190 voted against.) The ceremony was attended by Western ambassadors.

Legacy of WW II

The fears, trauma, and experiences of World War II could be easily manipulated for nationalist ends. Croatia had allied with Nazi Germany and Serbia had been occupied and run by a puppet Nazi government. Fascist Croatian Ustaše militias carried out a Nazi agenda while being supported by the Catholic Church.

One of their most notorious concentration camps was Jasenovac, an extermination camp established in Slavonia by the authorities of the Independent State of Croatia during World War II. The Jewish Virtual Library states that “the most reliable figures” estimate the number of Serbs killed by the Ustaše overall to be “between 330,000 and 390,000, with 45,000 to 52,000 Serbs murdered in Jasenovac.” (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d.)

In January 1942, Hungarian troops murdered 3,000 Serbs and Jews in Novi Sad, Vojvodina in what was known as “murder tourism.” The Serb Chetniks battled Croats, Nazis, Yugoslavian Communist partisan fighters, while also occasionally helping the Nazis. Serbia had a puppet Nazi regime which set up several camps for Jews and other minorities (Browning, 2012). The Serbs had reason to fear Croatian nationalists and Croatians disliked and distrusted the Serbs. On the other hand, Serb Chetnik forces committed genocide against Bosniaks in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Sanjak region, with the aim of establishing an ‘ethnically clean’ Greater Serbian state (Hoare, 2006).

International Context

Yugoslavia was seen as a buffer during the Cold War. As part of the nonaligned movement, Yugoslavia was not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc. When Mikhail Gorbachev became the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, he attempted to modernize the Soviet Union with Perestroika (reform) and Glasnost (openness). It was a thawing of the Cold War, and it was seized upon by Western countries hoping that Gorbachev’s reforms would reduce tensions. The position of the United States was to support Gorbachev and help him to prevent chaos if the Soviet Union began to unravel. Yugoslavia lost its importance as a Cold War buffer. As Yugoslavia began to break apart after the death of Tito, United States policy remained consistent. It would support the continuation of a “unified” Yugoslavian state. This played right into the hands of Milošević despite the dire warning of an October 18, 1990, National Intelligence Estimate by the CIA:

Yugoslavia will cease to function as a federal state within a year, and will probably dissolve within two. Economic reform will not stave off the breakup. […] a full-scale interrepublic war is unlikely, but serious intercommunal conflict will accompany the breakup and will continue afterward. The violence will be intractable and bitter. There is little the United States and its European allies can do to preserve Yugoslav unity.

Back in the USSR: Tbilisi, Georgia, USSR

To keep the Soviet Union together soviet leaders had to use force. Gorbachev was no exception. As republics clambered for independence, Gorbachev clamped down. On April 9, 1989, Soviet troops were ordered by Gorbachev to ruthlessly crush a peaceful protest in Tbilisi, Georgia. Twenty-one people were killed, dozens were injured, and hundreds suffered from tear gas. As the U.S. policy was to keep stability in the USSR by supporting Gorbachev, the U.S. did not support the pro-democracy demonstrators and Brent Scowcroft, the national security advisor signaled U.S. acquiescence, “We have no dog in this fight.” (Glaurdić, 2011, p. 170)

Events in the USSR would shape events in Yugoslavia. The lack of a U.S. reaction to the protest in Tbilisi gave a clear signal to Milošević who wanted to deal with Kosovo. On May 8, 1989, Milošević became President of Serbia. On June 28, 1989, he conducted what can best be described as a medieval passion play, stoking Serb nationalism at the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo. Over 1,000,000 Serbs went to Kosovo on a national pilgrimage and heard Milošević give his nationalist vision for a “Greater Serbia.” Church iconography was ever-present. By mid-1989 Kosovo and Vojvodina were reintegrated into Serbia and the Montenegro leadership was replaced by Milošević allies. In 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, and communist dictatorships were toppled. With the fall of Communism, elections would be held that would bring nationalist parties into power.

Weapons

The Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was seen as an institution that melded Yugoslavian identity together. In 1988, Serbs pushed through unconstitutional reforms restructuring its command and deployment and placed command in Belgrade. The army was dominated by Serbs (Bosniaks could not train as pilots for example) and purges began to reshape the army from the peoples’ army to a more nationalist force. Most of the officers were Serb. Serb officers who rejected the reshaping of the army were murdered. The JNA was not yet loyal to Milošević, but with Serb intentions clear, Catholics and Muslims no longer wanted to serve and were allowed to leave. With the history of slaughter in Bosnia during World War II and due to its central location, large installations and supply depots for the JNA were located in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Weapons and military training were also available in the Territorial Defense Forces. Each Republic had trained militias with separate command structures and stockpiles of weapons organized to conduct guerilla warfare if Yugoslavia was ever invaded. When the country fractured, each Republic would have easy access to weapons.

Genocide’s Early Warning Signs

Sheri P. Rosenberg rightly pointed out that “Genocide is a process, not an event.” (Rosenberg, 2012) There are several risk factors that that contribute to a national leadership’s choice to use genocide to meet its goals. Often it is in moments of transitional political instability where new power bases try to replace the old. Risk factors increase if exclusionary ideology exists, a state is isolated, and minority elites manipulate ethnic and religious cleavages. All of these were present in Yugoslavia in 1989.

Elections from failing states can also create a genocidal dynamic. In Bosnia, people gravitated to parties that represented their ethnicity, exacerbated by growing Serb nationalism. For electoral purposes, each party told its own story of collective victimization and injustices – which is where the memories of World War II could be usefully exploited. In Bosnia, three parties emerged: The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) led by Radovan Karadžić; the (Muslim dominated) Party of Democratic Action (SDA) led by Alija Izetbegović; and the Croatian Democratic Alliance (HDZ) led by Franjo Tuđman. Tuđman had a vision of a “Greater Croatia” that would be cleansed of Muslims and Serbs.