C. Duty and Causation

RIZZO v. GOODE, 423 U.S. 362 (1976)

Mr. Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court.

[1]The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, after parallel trials of separate actions filed in 1970, entered an order in 1973 requiring petitioners “to submit to [the District] Court for its approval a comprehensive program for improving the handling of citizen complaints alleging police misconduct” in accordance with a comprehensive opinion filed together with the order. The proposed program, negotiated between petitioners and respondents for the purpose of complying with the order, was incorporated six months later into a final judgment. Petitioner City Police Commissioner was thereby required, inter alia, to put into force a directive governing the manner by which citizens’ complaints against police officers should henceforth be handled by the department. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, upholding the District Court’s finding that the existing procedures for handling citizen complaints were “inadequate,” affirmed the District Court’s choice of equitable relief: “The revisions were … ordered because they appeared to have the potential for prevention of future police misconduct.” 506 F.2d 542, 548 (CA3 1974). We granted certiorari to consider petitioners’ claims that the judgment of the District Court represents an unwarranted intrusion by the federal judiciary into the discretionary authority committed to them by state and local law to perform their official functions. We find ourselves substantially in agreement with these claims, and we therefore reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I

[2]The central thrust of respondents’ efforts in the two trials was to lay a foundation for equitable intervention, in one degree or another, because of an assertedly pervasive pattern of illegal and unconstitutional mistreatment by police officers. This mistreatment was said to have been directed against minority citizens in particular and against all Philadelphia residents in general. The named individual and group respondents were certified to represent these two classes. The principal petitioners here—the Mayor, the City Managing Director, and the Police Commissioner—were charged with conduct ranging from express authorization or encouragement of this mistreatment to failure to act in a manner so as to assure that it would not recur in the future.

[3]Hearing some 250 witnesses during 21 days of hearings, the District Court was faced with a staggering amount of evidence; each of the 40-odd incidents might alone have been the piece de resistance of a short, separate trial. The District Court carefully and conscientiously resolved often sharply conflicting testimony, and made detailed findings of fact, which both sides now accept, with respect to eight of the incidents presented by the Goode respondents and with respect to 28 of those presented by COPPAR.

[4]The principal antagonists in the eight incidents recounted in Goode were Officers DeFazio and D’Amico, members of the city’s “Highway Patrol” force. They were not named as parties to the action. The District Court found the conduct of these officers to be violative of the constitutional rights of the citizen complainants in three of the incidents, and further found that complaints to the police Board of Inquiry had resulted in one case in a relatively mild five-day suspension and in another case a conclusion that there was no basis for disciplinary action.

[5]In only two of the 28 incidents recounted in COPPAR (which ranged in time from October 1969 to October 1970) did the District Court draw an explicit conclusion that the police conduct amounted to a deprivation of a federally secured right; it expressly found no police misconduct whatsoever in four of the incidents; and in one other the departmental policy complained of was subsequently changed. As to the remaining 21, the District Court did not proffer a comment on the degree of misconduct that had occurred: whether simply improvident, illegal under police regulations or state law, or actually violative of the individual’s constitutional rights. Respondents’ brief asserts that of this latter group, the facts as found in 14 of them “reveal [federal] violations.” While we think that somewhat of an overstatment, we accept it, arguendo, and thus take it as established that, insofar as the COPPAR record reveals, there were 16 incidents occurring in the city of Philadelphia over a year’s time in which numbers of police officers violated citizens’ constitutional rights. Additionally, the District Court made reference to citizens’ complaints to the police in seven of those 16; in four of which, involving conduct of constitutional dimension, the police department received complaints but ultimately took no action against the offending officers.

[6]The District Court made a number of conclusions of law, not all of which are relevant to our analysis. It found that the evidence did not establish the existence of any policy on the part of the named petitioners to violate the legal and constitutional rights of the plaintiff classes, but it did find that evidence of departmental procedure indicated a tendency to discourage the filing of civilian complaints and to minimize the consequences of police misconduct. It found that as to the larger plaintiff class, the residents of Philadelphia, only a small percentage of policemen commit violations of their legal and constitutional rights, but that the frequency with which such violations occur is such that “they cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated instances.” COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1973). In the course of its opinion, the District Court commented:

“In the course of these proceedings, much of the argument has been directed toward the proposition that courts should not attempt to supervise the functioning of the police department. Although, contrary to the defendants’ assertions, the Court’s legal power to do just that is firmly established, … I am not persuaded that any such drastic remedy is called for, at least initially, in the present cases.” Id., at 1320.

[7]The District Court concluded by directing petitioners to draft, for the court’s approval, “a comprehensive program for dealing adequately with civilian complaints,” to be formulated along the following “guidelines” suggested by the court:

“(1) Appropriate revision of police manuals and rules of procedure spelling out in some detail, in simple language, the ‘dos and don’ts’ of permissible conduct in dealing with civilians (for example, manifestations of racial bias, derogatory remarks, offensive language, etc.; unnecessary damage to property and other unreasonable conduct in executing search warrants; limitations on pursuit of persons charged only with summary offenses; recording and processing civilian complaints, etc.). (2) Revision of procedures for processing complaints against police, including (a) ready availability of forms for use by civilians in lodging complaints against police officers; (b) a screening procedure for eliminating frivolous complaints; (c) prompt and adequate investigation of complaints; (d) adjudication of nonfrivolous complaints by an impartial individual or body, insulated so far as practicable from chain of command pressures, with a fair opportunity afforded the complainant to present his complaint, and to the police officer to present his defense; and (3) prompt notification to the concerned parties, informing them of the outcome.” Id., at 1321.

[8]While noting that the “guidelines” were consistent with “generally recognized minimum standards” and imposed “no substantial burdens” on the police department, the District Court emphasized that respondents had no constitutional right to improved police procedures for handling civilian complaints. But given that violations of constitutional rights of citizens occur in “unacceptably” high numbers, and are likely to continue to occur, the court-mandated revision was a “necessary first step” in attempting to prevent future abuses. Ibid. On petitioners’ appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed.

II

[9]These actions were brought, and the affirmative equitable relief fashioned, under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. It provides that “[e]very person who, under color of [law] subjects, or causes to be subjected, any … person within the jurisdiction [of the United States] to the deprivation of any rights … secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law [or] suit in equity.” The plain words of the statute impose liability—whether in the form of payment of redressive damages or being placed under an injunction—only for conduct which “subjects, or causes to be subjected” the complainant to a deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws.

[10]The findings of fact made by the District Court at the conclusion of these two parallel trials—in sharp contrast to that which respondents sought to prove with respect to petitioners—disclose a central paradox which permeates that court’s legal conclusions. Individual police officers not named as parties to the action were found to have violated the constitutional rights of particular individuals, only a few of whom were parties plaintiff. As the facts developed, there was no affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by petitioners—express or otherwise—showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct. Instead, the sole causal connection found by the District Court between petitioners and the individual respondents was that in the absence of a change in police disciplinary procedures, the incidents were likely to continue to occur, not with respect to them but as to the members of the classes they represented. In sum, the genesis of this lawsuit—a heated dispute between individual citizens and certain policemen—has evolved into an attempt by the federal judiciary to resolve a “controversy” between the entire citizenry of Philadelphia and the petitioning elected and appointed officials over what steps might, in the Court of Appeals’ words, “[appear] to have the potential for prevention of future police misconduct.” 506 F.2d, at 548. The lower courts have, we think, overlooked several significant decisions of this Court in validating this type of litigation and the relief ultimately granted.

A

[11]We first of all entertain serious doubts whether on the facts as found there was made out the requisite Art. III case or controversy between the individually named respondents and petitioners. In O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), the individual respondents, plaintiffs in the District Court, alleged that petitioners, a county magistrate and judge, had embarked on a continuing, intentional practice of racially discriminatory bond setting, sentencing, and assessing of jury fees. No specific instances involving the individual respondents were set forth in the prayer for injunctive relief against the judicial officers. And even though respondents’ counsel at oral argument had stated that some of the named respondents had in fact “suffered from the alleged unconstitutional practices,” the Court concluded that “[p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief, however, if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.” Id., at 495-496. The Court further recognized that while “past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury,” the attempt to anticipate under what circumstances the respondents there would be made to appear in the future before petitioners “takes us into the area of speculation and conjecture.” Id., at 496-497. These observations apply here with even more force, for the individual respondents’ claim to “real and immediate” injury rests not upon what the named petitioners might do to them in the future—such as set a bond on the basis of race—but upon what one of a small, unnamed minority of policemen might do to them in the future because of that unknown policeman’s perception of departmental disciplinary procedures. This hypothesis is even more attenuated than those allegations of future injury found insufficient in O’Shea to warrant invocation of federal jurisdiction. Thus, insofar as the individual respondents were concerned, we think they lacked the requisite “personal stake in the outcome,” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), i.e., the order overhauling police disciplinary procedures.

B

[12]That conclusion alone might appear to end the matter, for O’Shea also noted that “if none of the named plaintiffs … establishes the requisite of a case or controversy with the defendants, none may seek relief on behalf of himself or any other member of the class” which they purport to represent. 414 U.S., at 494. But, unlike O’Shea, this case did not arise on the pleadings. The District Court, having certified the plaintiff classes, bridged the gap between the facts shown at trial and the classwide relief sought with an unprecedented theory of § 1983 liability. It held that the classes’ § 1983 actions for equitable relief against petitioners were made out on a showing of an “unacceptably high” number of those incidents of constitutional dimension—some 20 in all—occurring at large in a city of three million inhabitants, with 7,500 policemen.

[13]Nothing in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), the only decision of this Court cited by the District Court,^[1]

or any other case from this Court, supports such an open-ended construction of § 1983. In Hague, the pattern of police misconduct upon which liability and injunctive relief were grounded was the adoption and enforcement of deliberate policies by the defendants there (including the Mayor and the Chief of Police) of excluding and removing the plaintiff’s labor organizers and forbidding peaceful communication of their views to the citizens of Jersey City. These policies were implemented “by force and violence” on the part of individual policemen. There was no mistaking that the defendants proposed to continue their unconstitutional policies against the members of this discrete group.

[14]Likewise, in Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974), relied upon by the Court of Appeals and respondents here, we noted:

“The complaint charged that the enjoined conduct was but one part of a single plan by the defendants, and the District Court found a pervasive pattern of intimidation in which the law enforcement authorities sought to suppress appellees’ constitutional rights. In this blunderbuss effort the police not only relied on statutes … found constitutionally deficient, but concurrently exercised their authority under valid laws in an unconstitutional manner.” Id., at 812 (emphasis added).

The numerous incidents of misconduct on the part of the named Texas Rangers, as found by the District Court and summarized in this Court’s opinion, established beyond peradventure not only a “persistent pattern” but one which flowed from an intentional, concerted, and indeed conspiratorial effort to deprive the organizers of their First Amendment rights and place them in fear of coming back. Id., at 814-815.

[15]Respondents stress that the District Court not only found an “unacceptably high” number of incidents but held, as did the Court of Appeals, that “when a pattern of frequent police violations of rights is shown, the law is clear that injunctive relief may be granted.” 357 F. Supp., at 1318 (emphasis added). However, there was no showing that the behavior of the Philadelphia police was different in kind or degree from that which exists elsewhere; indeed, the District Court found “that the problems disclosed by the record … are fairly typical of [those] afflicting police departments in major urban areas.” Ibid. Thus, invocation of the word “pattern” in a case where, unlike Hague and Medrano, the defendants are not causally linked to it, is but a distant echo of the findings in those cases. The focus in Hague and Medrano was not simply on the number of violations which occurred but on the common thread running through them: a “pervasive pattern of intimidation” flowing from a deliberate plan by the named defendants to crush the nascent labor organizations. Medrano, supra, at 811. The District Court’s unadorned finding of a statistical pattern is quite dissimilar to the factual settings of these two cases.

[16]The theory of liability underlying the District Court’s opinion, and urged upon us by respondents, is that even without a showing of direct responsibility for the actions of a small percentage of the police force, petitioners’ failure to act in the face of a statistical pattern is indistinguishable from the active conduct enjoined in Hague and Medrano. Respondents posit a constitutional “duty” on the part of petitioners (and a corresponding “right” of the citizens of Philadelphia) to “eliminate” future police misconduct; a “default” of that affirmative duty being shown by the statistical pattern, the District Court is empowered to act in petitioners’ stead and take whatever preventive measures are necessary, within its discretion, to secure the “right” at issue. Such reasoning, however, blurs accepted usages and meanings in the English language in a way which would be quite inconsistent with the words Congress chose in § 1983. We have never subscribed to these amorphous propositions, and we decline to do so now.

[17]Respondents claim that the theory of liability embodied in the District Court’s opinion is supported by desegregation cases such as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971). But this case, and the long line of precedents cited therein, simply reaffirmed the body of law originally enunciated in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954):

“Nearly 17 years ago this Court held, in explicit terms, that state-imposed segregation by race in public schools denies equal protection of the laws. At no time has the Court deviated in the slightest degree from that holding or its constitutional underpinnings….

“Once a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court’s equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.” Swann, supra, at 11, 15.

[18]Respondents, in their effort to bring themselves within the language of Swann, ignore a critical factual distinction between their case and the desegregation cases decided by this Court. In the latter, segregation imposed by law had been implemented by state authorities for varying periods of time, whereas in the instant case the District Court found that the responsible authorities had played no affirmative part in depriving any members of the two respondent classes of any constitutional rights. Those against whom injunctive relief was directed in cases such as Swann and Brown were not administrators and school board members who had in their employ a small number of individuals, which latter on their own deprived black students of their constitutional rights to a unitary school system. They were administrators and school board members who were found by their own conduct in the administration of the school system to have denied those rights. Here, the District Court found that none of the petitioners had deprived the respondent classes of any rights secured under the Constitution. Under the well-established rule that federal “judicial powers may be exercised only on the basis of a constitutional violation,” Swann, supra, at 16, this case presented no occasion for the District Court to grant equitable relief against petitioners.

C

[19]Going beyond considerations concerning the existence of a live controversy and threshold statutory liability, we must address an additional and novel claim advanced by respondent classes. They assert that given the citizenry’s “right” to be protected from unconstitutional exercises of police power, and the “need for protection from such abuses,” respondents have a right to mandatory equitable relief in some form when those in supervisory positions do not institute steps to reduce the incidence of unconstitutional police misconduct. The scope of federal equity power, it is proposed, should be extended to the fashioning of prophylactic procedures for a state agency designed to minimize this kind of misconduct on the part of a handful of its employees. But on the facts of this case, not only is this novel claim quite at odds with the settled rule that in federal equity cases “the nature of the violation determines the scope of the remedy,” ibid., important considerations of federalism are additional factors weighing against it. Where, as here, the exercise of authority by state officials is attacked, federal courts must be constantly mindful of the “special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and State administration of its own law.” Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951), quoted in O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S., at 500.

[20]Section 1983 by its terms confers authority to grant equitable relief as well as damages, but its words “allow a suit in equity only when that is the proper proceeding for redress, and they refer to existing standards to determine what is a proper proceeding.” Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903) (Holmes, J.). Even in an action between private individuals, it has long been held that an injunction is “to be used sparingly, and only in a clear and plain case.” Irwin v. Dixion, 9 How. 10, 33 (1850). When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the activity of a government agency, even within a unitary court system, his case must contend with “the well-established rule that the Government has traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the ‘dispatch of its own internal affairs,’ Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896 (1961),” quoted in Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 83 (1974). The District Court’s injunctive order here, significantly revising the internal procedures of the Philadelphia police department, was indisputably a sharp limitation on the department’s “latitude in the ‘dispatch of its own internal affairs.'”

[21]When the frame of reference moves from a unitary court system, governed by the principles just stated, to a system of federal courts representing the Nation, subsisting side by side with 50 state judicial, legislative, and executive branches, appropriate consideration must be given to principles of federalism in determining the availability and scope of equitable relief. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 928 (1975).

[22]So strongly has Congress weighted this factor of federalism in the case of a state criminal proceeding that it has enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2283 to actually deny to the district courts the authority to issue injunctions against such proceedings unless the proceedings come within narrowly specified exceptions. Even though an action brought under § 1983, as this was, is within those exceptions, Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the underlying notions of federalism which Congress has recognized in dealing with the relationships between federal and state courts still have weight. Where an injunction against a criminal proceeding is sought under § 1983, “the principles of equity, comity, and federalism” must nonetheless restrain a federal court. 407 U.S., at 243.

[23]But even where the prayer for injunctive relief does not seek to enjoin the state criminal proceedings themselves, we have held that the principles of equity nonetheless militate heavily against the grant of an injunction except in the most extraordinary circumstances. In O’Shea v. Littleton, supra, at 502, we held that “a major continuing intrusion of the equitable power of the federal courts into the daily conduct of state criminal proceedings is in sharp conflict with the principles of equitable restraint which this Court has recognized in the decisions previously noted.” And the same principles of federalism may prevent the injunction by a federal court of a state civil proceeding once begun. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).

[24]Thus the principles of federalism which play such an important part in governing the relationship between federal courts and state governments, though initially expounded and perhaps entitled to their greatest weight in cases where it was sought to enjoin a criminal prosecution in progress, have not been limited either to that situation or indeed to a criminal proceeding itself. We think these principles likewise have applicability where injunctive relief is sought, not against the judicial branch of the state government, but against those in charge of an executive branch of an agency of state or local governments such as respondents here. Indeed, in the recent case of Mayor v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974), in which private individuals sought injunctive relief against the Mayor of Philadelphia, we expressly noted the existence of such considerations, saying: “There are also delicate issues of federal-state relationships underlying this case.” Id., at 615.

[25]Contrary to the District Court’s flat pronouncement that a federal court’s legal power to “supervise the functioning of the police department … is firmly established,” it is the foregoing cases and principles that must govern consideration of the type of injunctive relief granted here. When it injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disciplinary affairs of this state agency, the District Court departed from these precepts.

[26]For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decree of the District Court is

Reversed.

Mr. Justice Stevens took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

Mr. Justice Blackmun, with whom Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Marshall join, dissenting.

[27]To be sure, federal-court intervention in the daily operation of a large city’s police department, as the Court intimates, is undesirable and to be avoided if at all possible. The Court appropriately observes, however, ante, at 367, that what the Federal District Court did here was to engage in a careful and conscientious resolution of often sharply conflicting testimony and to make detailed findings of fact, now accepted by both sides, that attack the problem that is the subject of the respondents’ complaint. The remedy was one evolved with the defendant officials’ assent, reluctant though that assent may have been, and it was one that the police department concededly could live with. Indeed, the District Court, in its memorandum of December 18, 1973, stated that “the resolution of all the disputed items was more nearly in accord with the defendants’ position than with the plaintiffs’ position,” and that the relief contemplated by the earlier orders of March 14, 1973, see COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (ED Pa.), “did not go beyond what the defendants had always been willing to accept.” App. 190a. No one, not even this Court’s majority, disputes the apparent efficacy of the relief or the fact that it effectuated a betterment in the system and should serve to lessen the number of instances of deprival of constitutional rights of members of the respondent classes. What is worrisome to the Court is abstract principle, and, of course, the Court has a right to be concerned with abstract principle that, when extended to the limits of logic, may produce untoward results in other circumstances on a future day. See Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (Holmes, J.).

[28]But the District Court here, with detailed, careful, and sympathetic findings, ascertained the existence of violations of citizens’ constitutional rights, of a pattern of that type of activity, of its likely continuance and recurrence, and of an official indifference as to doing anything about it. The case, accordingly, plainly fits the mold of Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974), and Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939), despite the observation, 357 F. Supp., at 1319, that the evidence “does not establish the existence of any overall Police Department policy to violate the legal and constitutional rights of citizens, nor to discriminate on the basis of race” (emphasis supplied). I am not persuaded that the Court’s attempt to distinguish those cases from this one is at all successful. There must be federal relief available against persistent deprival of federal constitutional rights even by (or, perhaps I should say, particularly by) constituted authority on the state side.

[29]The Court entertains “serious doubts,” ante, at 371-372, as to whether there is a case or controversy here, citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974). O’Shea, however, presented quite different facts. There, the plaintiff-respondents had alleged a fear of injury from actions that would be subsequent to some future, valid arrest. The Court said:

“We assume that respondents will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid prosecution and conviction as well as exposure to the challenged course of conduct said to be followed by petitioners. Under these circumstances, where respondents do not claim any constitutional right to engage in conduct proscribed by therefore presumably permissible state laws, or indicate that it is otherwise their intention to so conduct themselves, the threat of injury from the alleged course of conduct they attack is simply too remote to satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement and permit adjudication by a federal court.” Id., at 497-498.

Here, by contrast, plaintiff-respondents are persons injured by past unconstitutional conduct (an allegation not made in the O’Shea complaint) and fear injury at the hands of the police regardless of whether they have violated a valid law.

[30]To the extent that Part II-A of the Court’s opinion today indicates that some constitutional violations might be spread so extremely thin as to prevent any individual from showing the requisite case or controversy, I must agree. I do not agree, however, with the Court’s substitution of its judgment for that of the District Court on what the evidence here shows. The Court states that what was shown was minimal, involving only a few incidents out of thousands of arrests in a city of several million population. Small as the ratio of incidents to arrests may be, the District Court nevertheless found a pattern of operation, even if no policy, and one sufficiently significant that the violations “cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated instances.” 357 F. Supp., at 1319. Nothing the Court has said demonstrates for me that there is no justification for that finding on this record. The Court’s criticism about numbers would be just as forceful, or would miss the mark just as much, with 100 incidents or 500 or even 3,000, when compared with the overall number of arrests made in the city of Philadelphia. The pattern line will appear somewhere. The District Court drew it this side of the number of proved instances. One properly may wonder how many more instances actually existed but were unproved because of the pressure of time upon the trial court, or because of reluctant witnesses, or because of inherent fear to question constituted authority in any degree, or because of a despairing belief, unfounded though it may be, that nothing can be done about it anyway and that it is not worth the effort. That it was worth the effort is convincingly demonstrated by the result in the District Court, by the affirmance, on the issues before us, by a unanimous panel of the Third Circuit, and by the support given the result below by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Philadelphia Bar Association, The Greater Philadelphia Movement, and the other entities that have filed briefs as amici curiae here in support of the respondents.

[31]The Court today appears to assert that a state official is not subject to the strictures of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless he directs the deprivation of constitutional rights. Ante, at 375-377. In so holding, it seems to me, the Court ignores both the language of § 1983 and the case law interpreting that language. Section 1983 provides a cause of action where a person acting under color of state law “subjects, or causes to be subjected,” any other person to a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. By its very words, § 1983 reaches not only the acts of an official, but also the acts of subordinates for whom he is responsible. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court said that § 1983 “should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions,” id., at 187, and:

“It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might be denied by state agencies.” Id., at 180. (Emphasis added.)

[32]I do not find it necessary to reach the question under what circumstances failure to supervise will justify an award of money damages, or whether an injunction is authorized where the superior has no consciousness of the wrongs being perpetrated by his subordinates.^[2]

It is clear that an official may be enjoined from consciously permitting his subordinates, in the course of their duties, to violate the constitutional rights of persons with whom they deal. In rejecting the concept that the official may be responsible under § 1983, the Court today casts aside reasoned conclusions to the contrary reached by the Courts of Appeals of 10 circuits.^[3]

[33]In the instant case, the District Court found that although there was no departmental policy of racial discrimination, “such violations do occur, with such frequency that they cannot be dismissed as rare, isolated instances; and that little or nothing is done by the city authorities to punish such infractions, or to prevent their recurrence,” 357 F. Supp., at 1319, and that it “is the policy of the department to discourage the filing of such complaints, to avoid or minimize the consequences of proven police misconduct, and to resist disclosure of the final disposition of such complaints.” Id., at 1318. Needless to say, petitioners were under a statutory duty to supervise their subordinates. See Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, c. 2, § 5-200. I agree with the District Court that its findings are sufficient to bring petitioners within the ambit of § 1983.

[34]Further, the applicability of § 1983 to controlling officers allows the district courts to avoid the necessity of injunctions issued against individual officers and the consequent continuing supervision by the federal courts of the day-to-day activities of the men on the street. The District Court aptly stated:

“Respect and admiration for the performance of the vast majority of police officers cannot justify refusal to confront the reality of the abuses which do exist. But deference to the essential role of the police in our society does mandate that intrusion by the courts into this sensitive area should be limited, and should be directed toward insuring that the police themselves are encouraged to remedy the situation.” 357 F. Supp., at 1320.

[35]I would regard what was accomplished in this case as one of those rightly rare but nevertheless justified instances—just as Allee and Hague—of federal-court “intervention” in a state or municipal executive area. The facts, the deprival of constitutional rights, and the pattern are all proved in sufficient degree. And the remedy is carefully delineated, worked out within the administrative structure rather than superimposed by edict upon it, and essentially, and concededly, “livable.” In the City of Brotherly Love—or in any other American city—no less should be expected. It is a matter of regret that the Court sees fit to nullify what so meticulously and thoughtfully has been evolved to satisfy an existing need relating to constitutional rights that we cherish and hold dear.

Rizzo v. Goode – Audio and Transcript of Oral Argument

Footnotes

1. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (CA4 1966), was also cited by the District Court for the proposition that federal courts have the legal power to “supervise the functioning of the police department.” 357 F. Supp., at 1320. But the court in Lankford intimated no such power, and the facts which confronted it are obviously distinguishable. There, in executing an “evil practice that has long and notoriously persisted in the Police Department,” the police, searching over a 19-day period for two black men who murdered one of their ranks, conducted some 300 warrantless searches of private residences in a predominately Negro area “at all hours of the day and night” on nothing more than “unverified anonymous [telephone] tips.” 364 F.2d, at 198, and 205 n.9. This “series of the most flagrant invasions of privacy ever to come under the scrutiny of a federal court” arose out of what several experienced police officers testified was a “routine practice” in “serious cases.” Id., at 200-201. Injunctive relief under § 1983 was granted against the defendant Police Commissioner because the wholesale raids were the “effectuation of a plan conceived by high ranking [police] officials,” a practice which in the interim the defendant had “renounced only obliquely, if at all,” and as to which “the danger of repetition has not been removed.” Id., at 202, 204. ↵

    

2. In this regard, however, this Court recently has approved the imposition of criminal liability without “consciousness of wrongdoing” for failure to supervise subordinates. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). The concept, thus, is far from novel doctrine. ↵

    

3. “Under section 1983, equitable relief is appropriate in a situation where governmental officials have notice of the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates and fail to prevent a recurrence of such misconduct. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496. (1939). From a legal standpoint, it makes no difference whether the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights are violated as a result of police behavior which is the product of the active encouragement and direction of their superiors or as a result of the superiors’ mere acquiescence in such behavior. In either situation, if the police officials had a duty, as they admittedly had here, to prevent the officers under their direction from committing the acts which are alleged to have occurred during the Convention, they are proper defendants in this action.” Schnell v. City of Chicago, 407 F.2d 1084, 1086 (CA7 1969). ↵

Notes on Rizzo v. Goode

1. 1. Among other things, Rizzo v. Goode addresses whether individual state and local government officials are suable under Section 1983 for constitutional violations directly caused by subordinate officials under their supervision. On what basis does the Supreme Court find that Section 1983 does not impose liability upon supervisory officials on a pure respondeat superior theory? Is this consistent with “the background of tort liability”? See Carter v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 370 n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev’d on other grounds, 409 U.S. 418 (1973) (“a superior officer is not subject to vicarious liability for the torts of his subordinate, whether at common law or under § 1983, because they are both servants of the same employer.”). At common law, who would be held vicariously liable for the constitutional harm caused by the line officers in Rizzo?
   2. May a supervisor be held vicariously liable under Section 1983 for the act of a subordinate if state law authorizes such liability? In Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir. 1979), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, relying on the Supreme Court’s repudiation of vicarious municipal liability in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (see Chapter IV, infra), refused to apply a state statute that created respondeat superior liability to an action under Section 1983:
      

      After parsing the language used in § 1983 and tracing legislative history, the Monell Court concluded that the official sued (in that case the city government) could not be held liable unless action by the officer or pursuant to this official policy caused a constitutional tort. In other words, it rejected respondeat superior as a theory of recovery under § 1983. We interpret Monell’s ruling as uniformly applicable to § 1983 actions in any state. Using the varying contours of local law to define the reach of a federal statutory right of action would make the availability of vicarious liability depend upon the location and, in some states, the nature of the tort. These incidental and irrelevant vagaries should not mold the contours of this national constitutional tort. Adopting each state’s law into § 1983 would create a lex loci doctrine of respondeat superior granted or withheld on the basis of state rather than federal policy.

      The language of the statute governing the remedies available in civil rights actions, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, supports our conclusion that state vicarious liability doctrines are inapplicable in § 1983 suits. Section 1988 allows state remedies to supplement remedies available under federal law when the federal remedies “are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against the law.” Section 1988 also provides that the state remedies adopted must not be inconsistent with the Constitution and the laws of the United States. Allowing Louisiana’s vicarious liability rules to govern this case would be directly contrary to Monell’s construction of § 1983, and thus to the requirements of § 1988.

      See also Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701 (1989) (rejecting use of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 to impose vicarious municipal liability for racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.)

   3. The Rizzo Court found that “there was no affirmative link between the occurrence of the various incidents of police misconduct and the adoption of any plan or policy by petitioners—express or otherwise—showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct.” 423 U.S. at 371. The lower federal courts have most readily deemed Rizzo’s “affirmative link” requirement satisfied where the supervisor expressly or tacitly authorized the very conduct that offends the Constitution. See Sanders v. Kennedy, 794 F.2d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 1986) (Police chief and city council members were improperly dismissed from an action where the complaint alleged that the plaintiff’s “rights were violated pursuant to an ‘official policy, practice and custom’ of the City of Anaheim and its Police Department.”); Maggette v. Dalsheim, 709 F.2d 800, 803 (2nd Cir. 1983) (personal involvement requirement satisfied by allegations that prison superintendent “promulgated and ordered the carrying out of policies that were themselves violations of the constitutional rights.”).
   4. While the authorization theory generally is founded upon approval in advance of the subordinate’s unconstitutional act, may liability be predicated on the supervisor’s failure to remedy the constitutional violation after it occurs? In Williams v. Smith, 781 F.2d 319 (2nd Cir. 1986), a prisoner averred that he had been unconstitutionally denied the opportunity to present a witness at a prison disciplinary hearing. He sued the prison superintendent who, in addition to affirming the disciplinary action, was directly responsible for the proper conduct of disciplinary proceedings at the prison. The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the action against the superintendent, reasoning that the plaintiff had a right to prove that the supervisory official “actively affirm[ed] the conviction on appeal” or accepted “a custom or policy at Attica allowing that unconstitutional practice to occur.” Id. at 324. Contra Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (mere review of result of disciplinary hearing does not establish affirmative link required to hold supervisor liable for due process violations at the hearing).
   5. One of the frequently sought means of meeting Rizzo’s “affirmative link” requirement is the theory that the supervisor has failed to properly train subordinate officials, who in turn transgressed constitutional norms. In Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), plaintiff alleged that he had been beaten by deputies while in police custody and sued the sheriff for failing to properly train the deputies. The court of appeals accepted the theory of liability, ruling that “[a] superior or municipality may be held liable where there is essentially a complete failure to train, or training that is so reckless or grossly negligent that future misconduct is almost inevitable.” Id. at 1528. While generally approving of liability for failure to train, some lower federal courts have stricken failure to train claims premised on a single instance of misconduct. Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 673 (3rd Cir. 1988). The viability of and standards for supervisory liability founded on a failure to train theory now may be governed by the Supreme Court’s analysis of municipal liability for failure to train in City of Canton v. Harris, Chapter IV, infra.
   6. In McClelland v. Facteau, 610 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1979), Cecil McClelland brought a Section 1983 action against two police chiefs for various invasions of rights arising out of his arrest and incarceration prior to posting bond. The police chiefs did not personally participate in the asserted violations. McClelland claimed, however, that the deprivation of his rights occurred because of the chiefs’ failure to act despite knowledge of prior instances of misconduct by the subordinate officials who McClelland encountered. Reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the police chiefs, the court of appeals accepted McClelland’s theory of liability:
      

      We agree with those courts that have found a cause of action under section 1983 when the defendant was in a position of responsibility, knew or should have known of the misconduct, yet failed to act to prevent future harm. E.g., Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885, 93 S. Ct. 116, 34 L. Ed.2d 141 (1972). The standard to be applied is the conduct of a reasonable person, under the circumstances, in the context of the authority of each police chief and what he knew or should have known. We find there is a genuine issue of fact whether defendants breached this duty.

      The rules and regulations cited of both police hierarchies indicate that the immediate and direct duty to supervise has been delegated, but the police chiefs have retained the ultimate responsibility for what goes on in the departments. The perimeters of their duty are uncertain and must be determined at trial.

      In order to establish a breach here, plaintiff must show that the defendant was adequately put on notice of prior misbehavior. Although both Schmerheim and Vigil denied any knowledge of wrongdoing by the three subordinates, McClelland countered by tendering newspaper articles and affidavits indicating that it was well known that rights were being violated in the Farmington jail and by state police officer Facteau, and showing Schmerheim was a party in two lawsuits involving the deaths of prisoners incarcerated in Farmington jail. Distant rumors that are too vague to prompt action by reasonable persons, or information that is reasonably believed to lack credibility do not provide sufficient notice…. We hold, however that McClelland’s showing was adequate to raise an issue of fact on the sufficiency of notice because the accusations contained in the material were recent and serious….

      If publicity or police misconduct was widespread and credible it may be inferred police chiefs who admitted reading the daily newspapers knew of it. They had ultimate responsibility for what went on in the departments, and it might be found that they should and could have taken steps that would have prevented the deprivation of McClelland’s rights. Defendants can, of course, refute these inferences at trial, but we cannot hold that they are entitled to judgment now as a matter of law.

      610 F.2d at 697-98.

      Can the failure to prevent recurrence of misconduct theory adopted in McClelland be reconciled with Rizzo v. Goode? How much notice of prior wrongs must the supervisor possess before he is obligated to intervene to prevent a recurrence of the misconduct? Compare Febus-Rodriguez v. Betancourt-Lebron, 14 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1994) (five previous unrelated complaints against an officer do not provide notice to supervisor of likelihood of constitutional violation) with Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553 (1st Cir. 1989) (superintendent liable for failing to act in face of knowledge of 13 citizen complaints and prior incidents of brutality). How many deprivations of constitutional rights were proven in Rizzo? How many violations would the Rizzo plaintiffs have had to prove to establish an actionable pattern?

   7. While the McClelland court appeared to endorse supervisory liability for negligent conduct, other courts have erected a more onerous standard of culpability:
      

      [S]upervisors who are merely negligent in failing to detect and prevent subordinates’ misconduct are not liable, because negligence is no longer culpable under section 1983…. Gross negligence is not enough either. The supervisors must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see. They must in other words act either knowingly or with deliberate or reckless indifference.

      Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1988). See also Maldonado-Denis v. Castillo-Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 582 (1st Cir. 1994) (“One way in which a supervisor’s action may [render him liable] is by formulating a policy, or engaging in a custom, that leads to the challenged occurrence…. Thus, even if a supervisor lacks actual knowledge of censurable conduct, he may be liable for the foreseeable consequences of such conduct if he would have known of it but for his deliberate indifference or willful blindness, and he had the power and authority to alleviate it.”).

   8. May the supervisor be held liable even if the official who physically inflicted the harm did not violate the Constitution? In Chew v. Gates, 27 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1994), plaintiff sued Los Angeles Police Officer Daniel Bunch as well as Police Chief Darryl Gates to recover damages after a police dog, Volker, bit Chew, who had fled after being stopped for a traffic violation. In considering a defense of issue preclusion raised by Chief Gates, the court determined the jury could find Officer Bunch not liable for his handling of the dog yet still hold Chief Gates responsible:
      

      A judgment that Bunch is not liable for releasing Volker, given all the circumstances, would not preclude a judgment that by implementing a policy of training and using the police dogs to attack unarmed, non-resisting suspects, including Chew, the remaining defendants caused a violation of Chew’s constitutional rights. Supervisory liability may be imposed under Section 1983 notwithstanding the exoneration of the officer whose actions are the immediate or precipitating cause of the constitutional injury…

      The jury in this case could have concluded that it was reasonable for Bunch to release Volker—even knowing what he was likely to do to Chew—given the fact that the procedures adopted by the city left him with no other means of apprehending the suspect that involved less risk of bodily injury to himself or the suspect.

      27 F.3d at 1438.

   9. Absent proof of habit, evidence that a state official has violated the Constitution on prior occasions generally will not be admissible in a Section 1983 action. See Fed. R. Evid. 404. If plaintiff also joins the official’s supervisor as a defendant on a theory of failing to prevent recurrence of unconstitutional acts, however, may evidence of the subordinate’s previous constitutional violations be admitted to establish the supervisor had notice of these violations? In Fletcher v. O’Donnell, 867 F.2d 791 (3rd Cir. 1989), plaintiff alleged that police officer O’Donnell had used excessive force in the course of an arrest. He sued the City of Allentown as well as Officer O’Donnell, alleging that the officer acted pursuant to the City’s custom of tolerating use of excessive force. In order to establish the city’s custom, plaintiff attempted to introduce evidence that Officer O’Donnell had used excessive force on prior occasions. The trial court refused to admit the evidence, ruling that it not only was irrelevant to the claim against O’Donnell, but also would unduly prejudice him.  The court of appeals reversed:
      

      [P]rejudice was not a valid reason for preventing Fletcher from proving a custom of toleration of use of excessive force by using the only evidence which would suffice for that purpose. There were other means available to protect O’Donnell from such prejudice, including a limiting instruction. Indeed the court could have heard the evidence outside the presence of the jury in the first instance, in order to determine whether Fletcher could establish a prima facie case of prejudice. Finally, the court could even consider a severance.

      Id. at 794.

   10. The Rizzo Court’s analysis of the standards for equitable relief will be examined in the chapter on remedies.  See Part VI(B), infra.

ASHCROFT v. IQBAL, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)

Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court.

[1]Respondent Javaid Iqbal is a citizen of Pakistan and a Muslim. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks he was arrested in the United States on criminal charges and detained by federal officials. Respondent claims he was deprived of various constitutional protections while in federal custody. To redress the alleged deprivations, respondent filed a complaint against numerous federal officials, including John Ashcroft, the former Attorney General of the United States, and Robert Mueller, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Ashcroft and Mueller are the petitioners in the case now before us. As to these two petitioners, the complaint alleges that they adopted an unconstitutional policy that subjected respondent to harsh conditions of confinement on account of his race, religion, or national origin.

[2]In the District Court petitioners raised the defense of qualified immunity and moved to dismiss the suit, contending the complaint was not sufficient to state a claim against them. The District Court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding the complaint was sufficient to state a claim despite petitioners’ official status at the times in question. Petitioners brought an interlocutory appeal in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The court, without discussion, assumed it had jurisdiction over the order denying the motion to dismiss; and it affirmed the District Court’s decision.

[3]Respondent’s account of his prison ordeal could, if proved, demonstrate unconstitutional misconduct by some governmental actors. But the allegations and pleadings with respect to these actors are not before us here. This case instead turns on a narrower question: Did respondent, as the plaintiff in the District Court, plead factual matter that, if taken as true, states a claim that petitioners deprived him of his clearly established constitutional rights. We hold respondent’s pleadings are insufficient.

I

[4]Following the 2001 attacks, the FBI and other entities within the Department of Justice began an investigation of vast reach to identify the assailants and prevent them from attacking anew. The FBI dedicated more than 4,000 special agents and 3,000 support personnel to the endeavor. By September 18 “the FBI had received more than 96,000 tips or potential leads from the public.” Dept. of Justice, Office of Inspector General, The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks 1, 11–12 (Apr.2003) (hereinafter OIG Report), http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0306/full.pdf?bcsi_scan_ 61073EC0F74759AD=0&bcsi_scan_filename=full.pdf (as visited May 14, 2009, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file).

[5]In the ensuing months the FBI questioned more than 1,000 people with suspected links to the attacks in particular or to terrorism in general. Id., at 1. Of those individuals, some 762 were held on immigration charges; and a 184–member subset of that group was deemed to be “of ‘high interest’” to the investigation. Id., at 111. The high-interest detainees were held under restrictive conditions designed to prevent them from communicating with the general prison population or the outside world. Id., at 112-113.

[6]Respondent was one of the detainees. According to his complaint, in November 2001 agents of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service arrested him on charges of fraud in relation to identification documents and conspiracy to defraud the United States. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147–148 (C.A.2 2007). Pending trial for those crimes, respondent was housed at the Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Brooklyn, New York. Respondent was designated a person “of high interest” to the September 11 investigation and in January 2002 was placed in a section of the MDC known as the Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit (ADMAX SHU). Id., at 148. As the facility’s name indicates, the ADMAX SHU incorporates the maximum security conditions allowable under Federal Bureau of Prison regulations. Ibid. ADMAX SHU detainees were kept in lockdown 23 hours a day, spending the remaining hour outside their cells in handcuffs and leg irons accompanied by a four-officer escort. Ibid.

[7]Respondent pleaded guilty to the criminal charges, served a term of imprisonment, and was removed to his native Pakistan. Id., at 149. He then filed a Bivens action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York against 34 current and former federal officials and 19 “John Doe” federal corrections officers. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed.2d 619 (1971). The defendants range from the correctional officers who had day-to-day contact with respondent during the term of his confinement, to the wardens of the MDC facility, all the way to petitioners—officials who were at the highest level of the federal law enforcement hierarchy. First Amended Complaint in No. 04–CV–1809 (JG)(JA), ¶¶ 10–11, App. to Pet. for Cert. 157a (hereinafter Complaint).

[8]The 21-cause-of-action complaint does not challenge respondent’s arrest or his confinement in the MDC’s general prison population. Rather, it concentrates on his treatment while confined to the ADMAX SHU. The complaint sets forth various claims against defendants who are not before us. For instance, the complaint alleges that respondent’s jailors “kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across” his cell without justification, id., ¶ 113, App. to Pet. for Cert. 176a; subjected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches when he posed no safety risk to himself or others, id., ¶¶ 143–145, App. to Pet. for Cert. 182a; and refused to let him and other Muslims pray because there would be “[n]o prayers for terrorists,” id., ¶ 154, App. to Pet. for Cert. 184a.

[9]The allegations against petitioners are the only ones relevant here. The complaint contends that petitioners designated respondent a person of high interest on account of his race, religion, or national origin, in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. The complaint alleges that “the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men … as part of its investigation of the events of September 11.” Id., ¶ 47, at 164a. It further alleges that “[t]he policy of holding post–September–11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.” Id., 69, at 168a. Lastly, the complaint posits that petitioners “each knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” respondent to harsh conditions of confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.” Id., ¶ 96, at 172a–173a. The pleading names Ashcroft as the “principal architect” of the policy, id., 10, at 157a, and identifies Mueller as “instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementation.” Id., ¶ 11, at 157a.

[10]Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state sufficient allegations to show their own involvement in clearly established unconstitutional conduct. The District Court denied their motion. Accepting all of the allegations in respondent’s complaint as true, the court held that “it cannot be said that there [is] no set of facts on which [respondent] would be entitled to relief as against” petitioners. Id. at 136a–137a (relying on Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Invoking the collateral-order doctrine petitioners filed an interlocutory appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. While that appeal was pending, this Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed.2d 929 (2007), which discussed the standard for evaluating whether a complaint is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.

[11]The Court of Appeals considered Twombly’ s applicability to this case. Acknowledging that Twombly retired the Conley no-set-of-facts test relied upon by the District Court, the Court of Appeals’ opinion discussed at length how to apply this Court’s “standard for assessing the adequacy of pleadings.” 490 F.3d, at 155. It concluded that Twombly called for a “flexible ‘plausibility standard,’ which obliges a pleader to amplify a claim with some factual allegations in those contexts where such amplification is needed to render the claim plausible.” Id., at 157–158. The court found that petitioners’ appeal did not present one of “those contexts” requiring amplification. As a consequence, it held respondent’s pleading adequate to allege petitioners’ personal involvement in discriminatory decisions which, if true, violated clearly established constitutional law. Id., at 174.

[12]Judge Cabranes concurred. He agreed that the majority’s “discussion of the relevant pleading standards reflect[ed] the uneasy compromise … between a qualified immunity privilege rooted in the need to preserve the effectiveness of government as contemplated by our constitutional structure and the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Id., at 178 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Judge Cabranes nonetheless expressed concern at the prospect of subjecting high-ranking Government officials—entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity and charged with responding to “a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic”—to the burdens of discovery on the basis of a complaint as nonspecific as respondent’s. Id., at 179. Reluctant to vindicate that concern as a member of the Court of Appeals, ibid., Judge Cabranes urged this Court to address the appropriate pleading standard “at the earliest opportunity.” Id., at 178. We granted certiorari, 554 U.S. ___, 128 S. Ct. 2931, 171 L. Ed.2d 863 (2008), and now reverse.

* * * * *

III

[13]In Twombly, supra, at 553-554, 127 S. Ct. 1955, the Court found it necessary first to discuss the antitrust principles implicated by the complaint. Here too we begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim of unconstitutional discrimination against officials entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity.

[14]In Bivens—proceeding on the theory that a right suggests a remedy—this Court “recognized for the first time an implied private action for damages against federal officers alleged to have violated a citizen’s constitutional rights.” Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 66, 122 S. Ct. 515, 151 L. Ed.2d 456 (2001). Because implied causes of action are disfavored, the Court has been reluctant to extend Bivens liability “to any new context or new category of defendants.” 534 U.S., at 68, 122 S. Ct. 515. See also Wilkie, 551 U.S., at 549–550, 127 S. Ct. 2588. That reluctance might well have disposed of respondent’s First Amendment claim of religious discrimination. For while we have allowed a Bivens action to redress a violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 99 S. Ct. 2264, 60 L. Ed.2d 846 (1979), we have not found an implied damages remedy under the Free Exercise Clause. Indeed, we have declined to extend Bivens to a claim sounding in the First Amendment. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 103 S. Ct. 2404, 76 L. Ed.2d 648 (1983). Petitioners do not press this argument, however, so we assume, without deciding, that respondent’s First Amendment claim is actionable under Bivens.

[15]In the limited settings where Bivens does apply, the implied cause of action is the “federal analog to suits brought against state officials under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.” Hartman, 547 U.S., at 254, n.2, 126 S. Ct. 1695. Cf. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S. Ct. 1692, 143 L. Ed.2d 818 (1999). Based on the rules our precedents establish, respondent correctly concedes that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal Brief 46 (“[I]t is undisputed that supervisory Bivens liability cannot be established solely on a theory of respondeat superior”). See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 56 L. Ed.2d 611 (1978) (finding no vicarious liability for a municipal “person” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); see also Dunlop v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 242, 269, 3 L.Ed. 329 (1812) (a federal official’s liability “will only result from his own neglect in not properly superintending the discharge” of his subordinates’ duties); Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U.S. 507, 515–516, 8 S. Ct. 1286, 3 L.Ed. 203 (1888) (“A public officer or agent is not responsible for the misfeasances or position wrongs, or for the nonfeasances, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subagents or servants or other persons properly employed by or under him, in the discharge of his official duties”). Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.

[16]The factors necessary to establish a Bivens violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue. Where the claim is invidious discrimination in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments, our decisions make clear that the plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with discriminatory purpose. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540–541, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 124 L. Ed.2d 472 (1993) (First Amendment); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 48 L. Ed.2d 597 (1976) (Fifth Amendment). Under extant precedent purposeful discrimination requires more than “intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.” Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S. Ct. 2282, 60 L. Ed.2d 870 (1979). It instead involves a decisionmaker’s undertaking a course of action “‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ [the action’s] adverse effects upon an identifiable group.” Ibid. It follows that, to state a claim based on a violation of a clearly established right, respondent must plead sufficient factual matter to show that petitioners adopted and implemented the detention policies at issue not for a neutral, investigative reason but for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or national origin.

[17]Respondent disagrees. He argues that, under a theory of “supervisory liability,” petitioners can be liable for “knowledge and acquiescence in their subordinates’ use of discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions among detainees.” Iqbal Brief 45-46. That is to say, respondent believes a supervisor’s mere knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution. We reject this argument. Respondent’s conception of “supervisory liability” is inconsistent with his accurate stipulation that petitioners may not be held accountable for the misdeeds of their agents. In a § 1983 suit or a Bivens action—where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants—the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. In the context of determining whether there is a violation of clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities.

IV

A

* * * * *

[18]To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id., at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955. The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Ibid. Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’ ” …

[19]Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Id., at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (Although for the purposes of a motion to dismiss we must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, we “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Id., at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. 490 F.3d, at 157–158. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(a)(2).

* * * * *

B

[20]Under Twombly ‘s construction of Rule 8, we conclude that respondent’s complaint has not “nudged [his] claims” of invidious discrimination “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” …

* * * * *

[21]We next consider the factual allegations in respondent’s complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. The complaint alleges that “the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men … as part of its investigation of the events of September 11.” Complaint ¶ 47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a. It further claims that “[t]he policy of holding post–September–11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.” Id., ¶ 69, at 168a. Taken as true, these allegations are consistent with petitioners’ purposefully designating detainees “of high interest” because of their race, religion, or national origin. But given more likely explanations, they do not plausibly establish this purpose.

[22]The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in good standing of al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim—Osama bin Laden—and composed in large part of his Arab Muslim disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of the policy was to target neither Arabs nor Muslims. On the facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful and justified by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections to those who committed terrorist acts. As between that “obvious alternative explanation” for the arrests, Twombly, supra, at 567, 127 S. Ct. 1955, and the purposeful, invidious discrimination respondent asks us to infer, discrimination is not a plausible conclusion.

[23]But even if the complaint’s well-pleaded facts give rise to a plausible inference that respondent’s arrest was the result of unconstitutional discrimination, that inference alone would not entitle respondent to relief. It is important to recall that respondent’s complaint challenges neither the constitutionality of his arrest nor his initial detention in the MDC. Respondent’s constitutional claims against petitioners rest solely on their ostensible “policy of holding post–September–11th detainees” in the ADMAX SHU once they were categorized as “of high interest.” Complaint ¶ 69, App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a. To prevail on that theory, the complaint must contain facts plausibly showing that petitioners purposefully adopted a policy of classifying post–September–11 detainees as “of high interest” because of their race, religion, or national origin.

[24]This the complaint fails to do. Though respondent alleges that various other defendants, who are not before us, may have labeled him a person of “of high interest” for impermissible reasons, his only factual allegation against petitioners accuses them of adopting a policy approving “restrictive conditions of confinement” for post–September–11 detainees until they were “‘cleared’ by the FBI.” Ibid. Accepting the truth of that allegation, the complaint does not show, or even intimate, that petitioners purposefully housed detainees in the ADMAX SHU due to their race, religion, or national origin. All it plausibly suggests is that the Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity. Respondent does not argue, nor can he, that such a motive would violate petitioners’ constitutional obligations. He would need to allege more by way of factual content to “nudg[e]” his claim of purposeful discrimination “across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S., at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955.

[25]To be sure, respondent can attempt to draw certain contrasts between the pleadings the Court considered in Twombly and the pleadings at issue here. InTwombly, the complaint alleged general wrongdoing that extended over a period of years, id., at 551, 127 S. Ct. 1955, whereas here the complaint alleges discrete wrongs—for instance, beatings—by lower level Government actors. The allegations here, if true, and if condoned by petitioners, could be the basis for some inference of wrongful intent on petitioners’ part. Despite these distinctions, respondent’s pleadings do not suffice to state a claim. Unlike in Twombly, where the doctrine of respondeat superior could bind the corporate defendant, here, as we have noted, petitioners cannot be held liable unless they themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic. Yet respondent’s complaint does not contain any factual allegation sufficient to plausibly suggest petitioners’ discriminatory state of mind. His pleadings thus do not meet the standard necessary to comply with Rule 8.

[26]It is important to note, however, that we express no opinion concerning the sufficiency of respondent’s complaint against the defendants who are not before us. Respondent’s account of his prison ordeal alleges serious official misconduct that we need not address here. Our decision is limited to the determination that respondent’s complaint does not entitle him to relief from petitioners.

C

[27]Respondent offers three arguments that bear on our disposition of his case, but none is persuasive.

1

[28]Respondent first says that our decision in Twombly should be limited to pleadings made in the context of an antitrust dispute. Iqbal Brief 37-38. This argument is not supported by Twombly and is incompatible with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Though Twombly determined the sufficiency of a complaint sounding in antitrust, the decision was based on our interpretation and application of Rule 8. 550 U.S., at 554, 127 S. Ct. 1955. That Rule in turn governs the pleading standard “in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.” Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1. Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for “all civil actions,” ibid., and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike. See 550 U.S., at 555–556, and n.3.

2

[29]Respondent next implies that our construction of Rule 8 should be tempered where, as here, the Court of Appeals has “instructed the district court to cabin discovery in such a way as to preserve” petitioners’ defense of qualified immunity “as much as possible in anticipation of a summary judgment motion.” Iqbal Brief 27. We have held, however, that the question presented by a motion to dismiss a complaint for insufficient pleadings does not turn on the controls placed upon the discovery process. Twombly, supra, at 559, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (“It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process through careful case management given the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

[30]Our rejection of the careful-case-management approach is especially important in suits where Government-official defendants are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity. The basic thrust of the qualified-immunity doctrine is to free officials from the concerns of litigation, including “avoidance of disruptive discovery.” Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 236, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 114 L. Ed.2d 277 (1991) (KENNEDY, J., concurring in judgment). There are serious and legitimate reasons for this. If a Government official is to devote time to his or her duties, and to the formulation of sound and responsible policies, it is counterproductive to require the substantial diversion that is attendant to participating in litigation and making informed decisions as to how it should proceed. Litigation, though necessary to ensure that officials comply with the law, exacts heavy costs in terms of efficiency and expenditure of valuable time and resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of the work of the Government. The costs of diversion are only magnified when Government officials are charged with responding to, as Judge Cabranes aptly put it, “a national and international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.” 490 F.3d, at 179.

[31]It is no answer to these concerns to say that discovery for petitioners can be deferred while pretrial proceedings continue for other defendants. It is quite likely that, when discovery as to the other parties proceeds, it would prove necessary for petitioners and their counsel to participate in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position. Even if petitioners are not yet themselves subject to discovery orders, then, they would not be free from the burdens of discovery.

[32]We decline respondent’s invitation to relax the pleading requirements on the ground that the Court of Appeals promises petitioners minimally intrusive discovery. That promise provides especially cold comfort in this pleading context, where we are impelled to give real content to the concept of qualified immunity for high-level officials who must be neither deterred nor detracted from the vigorous performance of their duties. Because respondent’s complaint is deficient under Rule 8, he is not entitled to discovery, cabined or otherwise.

3

[33]Respondent finally maintains that the Federal Rules expressly allow him to allege petitioners’ discriminatory intent “generally,” which he equates with a conclusory allegation. Iqbal Brief 32 (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 9). It follows, respondent says, that his complaint is sufficiently well pleaded because it claims that petitioners discriminated against him “on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.” Complaint ¶ 96, App. to Pet. for Cert. 172a–173a. Were we required to accept this allegation as true, respondent’s complaint would survive petitioners’ motion to dismiss. But the Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without reference to its factual context.

[34]It is true that Rule 9(b) requires particularity when pleading “fraud or mistake,” while allowing “[m]alice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind [to] be alleged generally.” But “generally” is a relative term. In the context of Rule 9, it is to be compared to the particularity requirement applicable to fraud or mistake. Rule 9 merely excuses a party from pleading discriminatory intent under an elevated pleading standard. It does not give him license to evade the less rigid—though still operative—strictures of Rule 8. See 5A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1301, p.291 (3d ed. 2004) (“[A] rigid rule requiring the detailed pleading of a condition of mind would be undesirable because, absent overriding considerations pressing for a specificity requirement, as in the case of averments of fraud or mistake, the general ‘short and plain statement of the claim’ mandate in Rule 8(a) … should control the second sentence of Rule 9(b)”). And Rule 8 does not empower respondent to plead the bare elements of his cause of action, affix the label “ general allegation,” and expect his complaint to survive a motion to dismiss.

V

[35]We hold that respondent’s complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to state a claim for purposeful and unlawful discrimination against petitioners. The Court of Appeals should decide in the first instance whether to remand to the District Court so that respondent can seek leave to amend his deficient complaint.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice SOUTER, with whom Justice STEVENS, Justice GINSBURG, and Justice BREYER join, dissenting.

[36]This case is here on the uncontested assumption that Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S. Ct. 1999, 29 L. Ed.2d 619 (1971), allows personal liability based on a federal officer’s violation of an individual’s rights under the First and Fifth Amendments, and it comes to us with the explicit concession of petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller that an officer may be subject to Bivens liability as a supervisor on grounds other than respondeat superior. The Court apparently rejects this concession and, althought it has no bearing on the majority’s resolution of this case, does away with supervisory liability under Bivens. The majority then misapplies the pleading standard under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), to conclude that the complaint fails to state a claim. I respectfully dissent from both the rejection of supervisory liability as a cognizable claim in the face of petitioners’ concession, and from the holding that the complaint fails to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

I

A

[37]Respondent Iqbal was arrested in November 2001 on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States and fraud in relation to identification documents, and was placed in pretrial detention at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 147–148 (C.A.2 2007). He alleges that FBI officials carried out a discriminatory policy by designating him as a person “‘of high interest’” in the investigation of the September 11 attacks solely because of his race, religion, or national origin. Owing to this designation he was placed in the detention center’s Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit for over six months while awaiting the fraud trial. Id., at 148. As I will mention more fully below, Iqbal contends that Ashcroft and Mueller were at the very least aware of the discriminatory detention policy and condoned it (and perhaps even took part in devising it), thereby violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights.^[4]

[38]Iqbal claims that on the day he was transferred to the special unit, prison guards, without provocation, “picked him up and threw him against the wall, kicked him in the stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across the room.” First Amended Complaint in No. 04–CV–1809 (JG)(JA), ¶ 113, App. to Pet. for Cert. 176a (hereinafter Complaint). He says that after being attacked a second time he sought medical attention but was denied care for two weeks. Id., ¶¶ 187-188, at 189a. According to Iqbal’s complaint, prison staff in the special unit subjected him to unjustified strip and body cavity searches, id., ¶¶ 136-140, at 181a, verbally berated him as a “‘terrorist’” and “‘Muslim killer,’” id., ¶¶ 87, at 170a-171a, refused to give him adequate food, id., ¶ 91, at 171a-172a, and intentionally turned on air conditioning during the winter and heating during the summer, id., ¶ 84, at 170a. He claims that prison staff interfered with his attempts to pray and engage in religious study, id., ¶¶ 153-154, at 183a-184a, and with his access to counsel, id., ¶¶ 168, 171, at 186a-87a.

[39]The District Court denied Ashcroft and Mueller’s motion to dismiss Iqbal’s discrimination claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Ashcroft and Mueller then asked this Court to grant certiorari on two questions:

“1. Whether a conclusory allegation that a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a plaintiff to allegedly unconstitutional acts purportedly committed by subordinate officials is sufficient to state individual-capacity claims against those officials under Bivens.

“2. Whether a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official may be held personally liable for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high-level supervisors, they had constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly carried out by such subordinate officials.” Pet. for Cert. I.

The Court granted certiorari on both questions. The first is about pleading; the second goes to the liability standard.

[40]In the first question, Ashcroft and Mueller did not ask whether “a cabinet-level officer or other high-ranking official” who “knew of, condoned, or agreed to subject a plaintiff to allegedly unconstitutional acts committed by subordinate officials” was subject to liability under Bivens. In fact, they conceded in their petition for certiorari that they would be liable if they had “actual knowledge” of discrimination by their subordinates and exhibited “‘deliberate indifference’” to that discrimination. Pet. for Cert. 29 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 128 L. Ed.2d 811 (1994)). Instead, they asked the Court to address whether Iqbal’s allegations against them (which they call conclusory) were sufficient to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), and in particular whether the Court of Appeals misapplied our decision in Twombly construing that rule. Pet. for Cert. 11–24.

[41]In the second question, Ashcroft and Mueller asked this Court to say whether they could be held personally liable for the actions of their subordinates based on the theory that they had constructive notice of their subordinates’ unconstitutional conduct. Id., at 25-33. This was an odd question to pose, since Iqbal has never claimed that Ashcroft and Mueller are liable on a constructive notice theory. Be that as it may, the second question challenged only one possible ground for imposing supervisory liability under Bivens. In sum, both questions assumed that a defendant could raise a Bivens claim on theories of supervisory liability other than constructive notice, and neither question asked the parties or the Court to address the elements of such liability.

[42]The briefing at the merits stage was no different. Ashcroft and Mueller argued that the factual allegations in Iqbal’s complaint were insufficient to overcome their claim of qualified immunity; they also contended that they could not be held liable on a theory of constructive notice. Again they conceded, however, that they would be subject to supervisory liability if they “had actual knowledge of the assertedly discriminatory nature of the classification of suspects as being ‘of high interest’ and they were deliberately indifferent to that discrimination.” Brief for Petitioners 50; see also Reply Brief for Petitioners 21–22. Iqbal argued that the allegations in his complaint were sufficient under Rule 8(a)(2) and Twombly, and conceded that as a matter of law he could not recover under a theory of respondeat superior. See Brief for Respondent Iqbal 46. Thus, the parties agreed as to a proper standard of supervisory liability, and the disputed question was whether Iqbal’s complaint satisfied Rule 8(a)(2).

[43]Without acknowledging the parties’ agreement as to the standard of supervisory liability, the Court asserts that it must sua sponte decide the scope of supervisory liability here. Ante, at 1947–1949. I agree that, absent Ashcroft and Mueller’s concession, that determination would have to be made; without knowing the elements of a supervisory liability claim, there would be no way to determine whether a plaintiff had made factual allegations amounting to grounds for relief on that claim. See Twombly, 550 U.S., at 557–558, 127 S. Ct. 1955. But deciding the scope of supervisory Bivens liability in this case is uncalled for. There are several reasons, starting with the position Ashcroft and Mueller have taken and following from it.

[44]First, Ashcroft and Mueller have, as noted, made the critical concession that a supervisor’s knowledge of a subordinate’s unconstitutional conduct and deliberate indifference to that conduct are grounds for Bivens liability. Iqbal seeks to recover on a theory that Ashcroft and Mueller at least knowingly acquiesced (and maybe more than acquiesced) in the discriminatory acts of their subordinates; if he can show this, he will satisfy Ashcroft and Mueller’s own test for supervisory liability. See Farmer, supra, at 842, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (explaining that a prison official acts with “deliberate indifference” if “the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm”). We do not normally override a party’s concession, see, e.g., United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 855, 116 S. Ct. 1793, 135 L. Ed.2d 124 (1996) (holding that “[i]t would be inappropriate for us to [e]xamine in this case, without the benefit of the parties’ briefing,” an issue the Government had conceded), and doing so is especially inappropriate when, as here, the issue is unnecessary to decide the case, see infra, at 1958-1959. I would therefore accept Ashcroft and Mueller’s concession for purposes of this case and proceed to consider whether the complaint alleges at least knowledge and deliberate indifference.

[45]Second, because of the concession, we have received no briefing or argument on the proper scope of supervisory liability, much less the full-dress argument we normally require. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 676–677, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L. Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). We consequently are in no position to decide the precise contours of supervisory liability here, this issue being a complicated one that has divided the Courts of Appeals. See infra, at 1957–1959. This Court recently remarked on the danger of “bad decisionmaking” when the briefing on a question is “woefully inadequate,” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 229, 129 S. Ct. 808, 819, 172 L. Ed.2d 565 (2009), yet today the majority answers a question with no briefing at all. The attendant risk of error is palpable.

[46]Finally, the Court’s approach is most unfair to Iqbal. He was entitled to rely on Ashcroft and Mueller’s concession, both in their petition for certiorari and in their merits briefs, that they could be held liable on a theory of knowledge and deliberate indifference. By overriding that concession, the Court denies Iqbal a fair chance to be heard on the question.

B

[47]The majority, however, does ignore the concession. According to the majority, because Iqbal concededly cannot recover on a theory of respondeat superior, it follows that he cannot recover under any theory of supervisory liability. Ante, at 1948-1949. The majority says that in a Bivens action, “where masters do not answer for the torts of their servants,” “the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a misnomer,” and that “[a]bsent vicarious liability, each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.” Ibid. Lest there be any mistake, in these words the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely. The nature of a supervisory liability theory is that the supervisor may be liable, under certain conditions, for the wrongdoing of his subordinates, and it is this very principle that the majority rejects. Ante, at 1952 (“[P]etitioners cannot be held liable unless they themselves acted on account of a constitutionally protected characteristic”).

[48]The dangers of the majority’s readiness to proceed without briefing and argument are apparent in its cursory analysis, which rests on the assumption that only two outcomes are possible here: respondeat superior liability, in which “an employer is subject to liability for torts committed by employees while acting within the scope of their employment,” Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.04 (2005), or no supervisory liability at all. The dichotomy is false. Even if an employer is not liable for the actions of his employee solely because the employee was acting within the scope of employment, there still might be conditions to render a supervisor liable for the conduct of his subordinate. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Melendez–Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 14 (C.A.1 2005) (distinguishing between respondeat superior liability and supervisory liability); Bennett v. Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 818 (C.A.6 2005) (same); Richardson v. Goord, 347 F.3d 431, 435 (C.A.2 2003) (same); Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954, 961 (C.A.8 1993) (same).

[49]In fact, there is quite a spectrum of possible tests for supervisory liability: it could be imposed where a supervisor has actual knowledge of a subordinate’s constitutional violation and acquiesces, see, e.g., Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1194 (C.A.3 1995); Woodward v. Worland, 977 F.2d 1392, 1400 (C.A.10 1992); or where supervisors “ ‘know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see,’” International Action Center v. United States, 365 F.3d 20, 28 (C.A.D.C. 2004) (Roberts, J.) (quoting Jones v. Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992 (C.A.7 1988) (Posner, J.)); or where the supervisor has no actual knowledge of the violation but was reckless in his supervision of the subordinate, see, e.g., Hall, supra, at 961; or where the supervisor was grossly negligent, see, e.g., Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 902 (C.A.1 1988). I am unsure what the general test for supervisory liability should be, and in the absence of briefing and argument I am in no position to choose or devise one.

[50]Neither is the majority, but what is most remarkable about its foray into supervisory liability is that its conclusion has no bearing on its resolution of the case. The majority says that all of the allegations in the complaint that Ashcroft and Mueller authorized, condoned, or even were aware of their subordinates’ discriminatory conduct are “conclusory” and therefore are “not entitled to be assumed true.” Ante, at 1951. As I explain below, this conclusion is unsound, but on the majority’s understanding of Rule 8(a)(2) pleading standards, even if the majority accepted Ashcroft and Mueller’s concession and asked whether the complaint sufficiently alleges knowledge and deliberate indifference, it presumably would still conclude that the complaint fails to plead sufficient facts and must be dismissed.^[5]

II

[51]Given petitioners’ concession, the complaint satisfies Rule 8(a)(2). Ashcroft and Mueller admit they are liable for their subordinates’ conduct if they “had actual knowledge of the assertedly discriminatory nature of the classification of suspects as being ‘of high interest’ and they were deliberately indifferent to that discrimination.” Brief for Petitioners 50. Iqbal alleges that after the September 11 attacks the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) “arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men,” Complaint ¶ 47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, that many of these men were designated by high-ranking FBI officials as being “‘of high interest,’” id., ¶¶ 48, 50, at 164a, and that in many cases, including Iqbal’s, this designation was made “because of the race, religion, and national origin of the detainees, and not because of any evidence of the detainees’ involvement in supporting terrorist activity,” id., ¶ 49. The complaint further alleges that Ashcroft was the “principal architect of the policies and practices challenged,” id., ¶ 10, at 157a, and that Mueller “was instrumental in the adoption, promulgation, and implementation of the policies and practices challenged,” id., ¶ 11. According to the complaint, Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [Iqbal] to these conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.” Id., ¶ 96, at 172a-173a. The complaint thus alleges, at a bare minimum, that Ashcroft and Mueller knew of and condoned the discriminatory policy their subordinates carried out. Actually, the complaint goes further in alleging that Ashcroft and Muller affirmatively acted to create the discriminatory detention policy. If these factual allegations are true, Ashcroft and Mueller were, at the very least, aware of the discriminatory policy being implemented and deliberately indifferent to it.

[52]Ashcroft and Mueller argue that these allegations fail to satisfy the “plausibility standard” of Twombly. They contend that Iqbal’s claims are implausible because such high-ranking officials “tend not to be personally involved in the specific actions of lower-level officers down the bureaucratic chain of command.” Brief for Petitioners 28. But this response bespeaks a fundamental misunderstanding of the enquiry that Twombly demands. Twombly does not require a court at the motion-to-dismiss stage to consider whether the factual allegations are probably true. We made it clear, on the contrary, that a court must take the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be. See Twombly, 550 U.S., at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (a court must proceed “on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)”); id., at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (“[A] well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of the facts alleged is improbable”); see also Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327, 109 S. Ct. 1827, 104 L. Ed.2d 338 (1989) (Rule 12(b)(6) does not countenance … dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations”). The sole exception to this rule lies with allegations that are sufficiently fantastic to defy reality as we know it: claims about little green men, or the plaintiff’s recent trip to Pluto, or experiences in time travel. That is not what we have here.

[53]Under Twombly, the relevant question is whether, assuming the factual allegations are true, the plaintiff has stated a ground for relief that is plausible. That is, in Twombly‘s words, a plaintiff must “allege facts” that, taken as true, are “suggestive of illegal conduct.” 550 U.S., at 564, n.8, 127 S. Ct. 1955. In Twombly, we were faced with allegations of a conspiracy to violate § 1 of the Sherman Act through parallel conduct. The difficulty was that the conduct alleged was “consistent with conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.” Id., at 554, 127 S. Ct. 1955. We held that in that sort of circumstance, “[a]n allegation of parallel conduct is … much like a naked assertion of conspiracy in a § 1 complaint: it gets the complaint close to stating a claim, but without some further factual enhancement it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id., at 557, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (brackets omitted). Here, by contrast, the allegations in the complaint are neither confined to naked legal conclusions nor consistent with legal conduct. The complaint alleges that FBI officials discriminated against Iqbal solely on account of his race, religion, and national origin, and it alleges the knowledge and deliberate indifference that, by Ashcroft and Mueller’s own admission, are sufficient to make them liable for the illegal action. Iqbal’s complaint therefore contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id., at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955.

[54]I do not understand the majority to disagree with this understanding of “plausibility” under Twombly. Rather, the majority discards the allegations discussed above with regard to Ashcroft and Mueller as conclusory, and is left considering only two statements in the complaint: that “the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men … as part of its investigation of the events of September 11,” Complaint ¶ 47, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, and that “[t]he policy of holding post–September–11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001,” id., ¶ 69, at 168a. See ante, at 1951. I think the majority is right in saying that these allegations suggest only that Ashcroft and Mueller “sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity,” ante, at 1952, and that this produced “a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims,” ante, at 1951–1952. And I agree that the two allegations selected by the majority, standing alone, do not state a plausible entitlement to relief for unconstitutional discrimination.

[55]But these allegations do not stand alone as the only significant, nonconclusory statements in the complaint, for the complaint contains many allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to the discriminatory practices of their subordinates. See Complaint ¶ 10, App. to Pet. for Cert. 157a (Ashcroft was the “principal architect” of the discriminatory policy); id., 11 (Mueller was “instrumental” in adopting and executing the discriminatory policy); id., 96, at 172a–173a (Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” Iqbal to harsh conditions “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate penological interest”).

[56]The majority says that these are “bare assertions” that, “much like the pleading of conspiracy in Twombly, amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim” and therefore are “not entitled to be assumed true.” Ante, at 1951 (quoting Twombly, supra, at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955). The fallacy of the majority’s position, however, lies in looking at the relevant assertions in isolation. The complaint contains specific allegations that, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the Chief of the FBI’s International Terrorism Operations Section and the Assistant Special Agent in Charge for the FBI’s New York Field Office implemented a policy that discriminated against Arab Muslim men, including Iqbal, solely on account of their race, religion, or national origin. See Complaint ¶¶ 47–53, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a–165a. Viewed in light of these subsidiary allegations, the allegations singled out by the majority as “conclusory” are no such thing. Iqbal’s claim is not that Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” him to a discriminatory practice that is left undefined; his allegation is that “they knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject” him to a particular, discrete, discriminatory policy detailed in the complaint. Iqbal does not say merely that Ashcroft was the architect of some amorphous discrimination, or that Mueller was instrumental in an ill-defined constitutional violation; he alleges that they helped to create the discriminatory policy he has described. Taking the complaint as a whole, it gives Ashcroft and Mueller “‘fair notice of what the … claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Twombly, 550 U.S., at 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed.2d 80 (1957) (omission in original)).

[57]That aside, the majority’s holding that the statements it selects are conclusory cannot be squared with its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as nonconclusory. For example, the majority takes as true the statement that “[t]he policy of holding post–September–11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 2001.” Complaint ¶ 69, App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a; see ante, at 1951. This statement makes two points: (1) after September 11, the FBI held certain detainees in highly restrictive conditions, and (2) Ashcroft and Mueller discussed and approved these conditions. If, as the majority says, these allegations are not conclusory, then I cannot see why the majority deems it merely conclusory when Iqbal alleges that (1) after September 11, the FBI designated Arab Muslim detainees as being of “‘high interest’” “because of the race, religion, and national origin of the detainees, and not because of any evidence of the detainees’ involvement in supporting terrorist activity,” Complaint ¶¶ 48-50, App. to Pet. for Cert. 164a, and (2) Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed” to that discrimination, id., ¶ 96, at 172a. By my lights, there is no principled basis for the majority’s disregard of the allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to their subordinates’ discrimination.

I respectfully dissent.

Justice BREYER, dissenting.

[58]I agree with Justice SOUTER and join his dissent. I write separately to point out that, like the Court, I believe it important to prevent unwarranted litigation from interfering with “the proper execution of the work of the Government.” Ante, at 1953. But I cannot find in that need adequate justification for the Court’s interpretation of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed.2d 929 (2007), and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8. The law, after all, provides trial courts with other legal weapons designed to prevent unwarranted interference. As the Second Circuit explained, where a Government defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, a trial court, responsible for managing a case and “mindful of the need to vindicate the purpose of the qualified immunity defense,” can structure discovery in ways that diminish the risk of imposing unwarranted burdens upon public officials. See Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2007). A district court, for example, can begin discovery with lower level government defendants before determining whether a case can be made to allow discovery related to higher level government officials. See ibid. Neither the briefs nor the Court’s opinion provides convincing grounds for finding these alternative case-management tools inadequate, either in general or in the case before us. For this reason, as well as for the independently sufficient reasons set forth in Justice SOUTER’s opinion, I would affirm the Second Circuit.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal – Audio and Transcript of Oral Argument

Footnotes

4. Iqbal makes no claim against Ashcroft and Mueller based simply on his right, as a pretrial detainee, to be free from punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt on the fraud charges. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). ↵

    

5. If I am mistaken, and the majority’s rejection of the concession is somehow outcome determinative, then its approach is even more unfair to Iqbal than previously explained, see supra, at 692, for Iqbal had no reason to argue the (apparently dispositive) supervisory liability standard in light of the concession. ↵

    

Notes on Ashcroft v. Iqbal

1. Most constitutional rights are not absolute. Rather, to assess whether the government deprived plaintiff of constitutional liberties, the court must weigh the government’s justification for the invasion of plaintiff’s autonomy. For example, the Fourth Amendment allows an official to invade the citizen’s reasonable expectation of privacy where the government has probable cause and a warrant to conduct a search (or an exception to the probable cause or warrant requirement). The Iqbal Court’s holding that plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to state a “plausible” claim for relief, then, poses a significant obstacle where the plaintiff does not possess the facts on which the government relies to sustain its actions. These barriers are heightened by the Court’s apparent holding that the plaintiff not only must plead sufficient facts to make it plausible that defendant violated the Constitution, but also must allege facts that establish that is plausible the defendant is not sheltered by qualified immunity. Therefore, we will defer consideration of the impact of Iqbal’s pleading standard on plaintiff’s ability to plead a viable Section 1983 claim until examination of the qualified immunity defense. See Part III(B), infra.
2. Was the Supreme Court’s holding that a supervisory official may be held liable only where the supervisor himself violated the Constitution logically necessary to avoid imposing vicarious liability?
   1. Is the Court’s requirement that plaintiff prove that the supervisor violated the Constitution compatible with the language of Section 1983? The legislative history of the statute? The policy underpinnings of Section 1983? Compare Kit Kinports, Iqbal and Supervisory Immunity, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 1291, 1297-1300 (2010) with Sheldon Nahmod, Constitutional Torts, Over-Deterrence and Supervisory Liability After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 279 (2010).
   2. Attorney General Ashcroft and FBI Director Mueller never argued that plaintiff must prove that they individually violated the Constitution in order hold them responsible for constitutional violations physically inflicted by subordinate officials. In their Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Ashcroft and Mueller presented the following question: “Whether a cabinet-level officer or high ranking official may be held personally liable for the allegedly unconstitutional acts of subordinate officials on the ground that, as high-level supervisors, they had constructive notice of the discrimination allegedly carried out by such subordinate officials.” Petition for Certiorari at 1, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015). Ashcroft and Mueller conceded high-level officials could be sued not only for their direct involvement in deprivations of constitutional rights, but also for their “deliberate indifference in the face of information that rights of others are being violated.” Initial Brief of Appellants at 14, 44, Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (No. 07-1015). Defendants argued that constructive notice of wrongdoing was insufficient to meet that test; rather, “[t]he proper standard … would preclude liability unless petitioners had actual knowledge of the assertedly discriminatory nature of the classification of suspects of being of ‘high interest’ and they were deliberately indifferent to that discrimination.” Id. at 50 (emphasis supplied). Why did the Court adopt a standard of supervisory liability that was neither raised in the lower courts nor argued by the parties?
3. Courts have varied in how stringently they apply the discriminatory purpose standard of culpability in Section 1983 actions against supervisors for violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
   1. In Powell v. City of New York, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94186 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2016), an inmate sued prison officials for not calling him to prayer services despite the fact that he registered as Muslim with the prison. The court determined that there was no underlying constitutional violation, and therefore no supervisory liability. However, “out of an abundance of caution” the court went on in dicta to discard old standards of supervisory liability. Id. Prior to Iqbal, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit evaluated five factors to establish supervisory liability (the Colon factors): “(1) Defendant participated directly in the alleged violation (2) Defendant, after being informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong (3) Defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) Defendant was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, (5) Defendant exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of plaintiffs by failing to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.” Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). The District Court decided after Iqbal, “at a minimum, therefore, the second, fourth, and fifth Colon factors—which do not require any showing of discriminatory ‘purpose’ by the supervisor—can no longer be relied on to hold a senior official personally liable for conduct by her juniors in violation of the Equal Protection clause of the 14th Amendment.” Powell v. City of New York, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94186 at *28, *29. See also Butler v. Suffolk County, 289 F.R.D. 80, 94 n. (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he weight of authority among the district courts in the Eastern District of New York suggests that only two of the Colon factors—direct participation and the creation of a policy or custom—survive Iqbal.”). But see Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 117 (2d Cir. 2014) (“We have not yet determined the contours of the supervisory liability test, including the gross negligence prong, after Iqbal.  We need not decide this question here.”).
   2. In Locke v. Haessig, 788 F.3d 662 (7th Cir. 2015), plaintiff alleged he had been sexually harassed by his parole officer and complained about the harassment to the parole officer’s supervisor. Plaintiff then sued the supervisor for violating the Equal Protection Clause, alleging the supervisor refused to act on the harassment complaint because the plaintiff was male. The court of appeals rejected defendant’s contention that only action—and not inaction—could establish the specific intent to discriminate required by Iqbal. Rather, the court ruled, “Short perhaps only of a confession of intentional discrimination, selective inaction can be strong evidence of discriminatory intent.” Locke, 788 F. 3d at 671.
   3. In Burke v. New Mexico, 696 Fed. Appx. 325 (10th Cir. 2017), Heather Burke, an IT Generalist working at the New Mexico General Services Department, alleged she had been harassed based upon her gender and that the Department compensated men more than women employed in the same position. Burke sued Department Secretary Edwynn Burckle, alleging that Burckle had failed to properly train and discipline his staff. The court determined that plaintiff’s Complaint was insufficient because she had not alleged any specific deficiency in Burckle’s training that actually caused unequal treatment. However, the court acknowledged, “deliberate indifference to known sexual harassment can, under certain circumstances, serve as a basis for supervisory liability under an Equal Protection theory.” Burke, 696 Fed. Appx. at 330.
4. Does Iqbal require that plaintiff plead and prove in every Section 1983 case that the supervisor acted with the purpose of violating the Constitution?
   1. In OSU Student Alliance v. Ray, 699 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2012), the Oregon State University (OSU) Student Alliance group asserted a § 1983 supervisory liability claim against the President and Vice-President of the University. Plaintiff alleged the defendants knowingly acquiesced in the Director of Facilities’ removal of bins that housed the Alliance’s student-run conservative newspaper, in violation of their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In deciding which culpability standard to apply, the court stated:
      

      The question is whether allegations of supervisory knowledge and acquiescence suffice to state claims for speech- based first amendment and equal protection violations. Iqbal does not answer this question. [Iqbal’s] holding was based on the elements of invidious discrimination in particular, not on some blanket requirement that applies equally to all constitutional tort claims…. [There] are only three instances where the Supreme Court has required specific intent for Constitutional torts: (1) Due Process Claims for injury in a high speed chase … (2) Eighth Amendment claims for injuries suffered during a response to a prison disturbance … (3) Invidious Discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause…. While a specific intent requirement inheres in claims for invidious discrimination, the same requirement does not inhere in claims for free speech.

      Id. at 1071-75.  See also Sash v. United States, 674 F. Supp 2d 531, 544 (S.D.N.Y 2009) (pre-Iqbal personal involvement standards may apply “[w]here the constitutional claim does not require a showing of discriminatory intent, but instead relies on the unreasonable conduct or deliberate indifference standards of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments.”).

5. As noted earlier, the lower federal courts had recognized several theories under which the supervisor’s failure to act would satisfy the “affirmative link” requirement set forth in Rizzo v. Goode. See Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995) (supervisor may be held liable if he knew of and acquiesced in constitutional deprivation; failed to act to remedy a known violation of Constitution; or failed to adequately train or supervise subordinates). In the wake of Iqbal, the lower federal courts have divided over whether and when a supervisor’s failure to act may give rise to liability.
   1. Several courts have concluded that the Iqbal Court’s statement that a government official “is only liable for his or her misconduct” entirely eliminated Section 1983 claims based upon the inaction of supervisors. See Joseph v. Fischer, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96952 at *43 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2009) (Suit against prison supervisor who took no action in response to inmate’s letters complaining about series of unconstitutional actions of subordinates was “precisely the type of claim Iqbal eliminated”); Bellamy v. Mount Vernon Hosp., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54141 at *28 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2009) (Granting summary judgment to defendant on claim that supervisor was deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s medical needs in violation of Eighth Amendment; after Iqbal, liability could no longer be imposed on ground that supervisor “knew of and acquiesced to a constitutional violation committed by a subordinate”); Newton v. City of New York, 640 F. Supp. 2d 426, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (Supervisor cannot be held liable for failing to adequately train detectives because Iqbal requires that supervisor had to take a “direct action” towards the plaintiff in order to be liable); Jacobs v. Strickland, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55133 at *10 (S.D. Ohio June 30, 2009) (Supervisor’s actual knowledge of the constitutional violation not sufficient to give rise to liability unless supervisor “actually participate[d] in or encourage[d]” constitutional violation).
   2. In Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242-42 (6th Cir. 2016), the court of appeals set forth the elements necessary to hold a supervisor liable under Section 1983:
      

      [T]here are clear situations in which supervisory liability does not attach. It is well-settled that “[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior.” In other words, a supervisor cannot be held liable simply because he or she was charged with overseeing a subordinate who violated the constitutional rights of another. Consequently, a mere failure to act will not suffice to establish supervisory liability. We have long held that supervisory liability requires some “active unconstitutional behavior” on the part of the supervisor.

      However, “active” behavior does not mean “active” in the sense that the supervisor must have physically put his hands on the injured party or even physically been present at the time of the constitutional violation

      “[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” We have interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.” (citations omitted).

      See Garza v. Lansing Sch. Dist., 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 27523, No. 19-1645 (6th Cir. August 28, 2020) at *20 (“A defendant may ‘knowingly acquiesce[ ] in the unconstitutional conduct of his subordinates through the execution of his job functions,’ including by failing to take precautions against likely violations.”).

   3. Other courts have ruled that Iqbal did not universally repudiate liability for a supervisor’s failure to act. Rather, whether inaction could both satisfy Iqbal and suffice to show an affirmative link between the supervisory defendant and the violation depends upon the culpability plaintiff is required to prove to establish an infringement of the particular constitutional right in issue.
      1. The lower courts have agreed that because plaintiff must prove purposeful discrimination to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, officials are not liable merely for failing to act in the face of discriminatory acts by persons who they supervise. T.E. v. Grindle, 599 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2010); Cole v. FBI, 791 F. Supp.2d 1229 (D. Mont. 2010).
      2. In Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011), the complaint alleged a deputy sheriff of the Los Angeles County jail opened the door of plaintiff Dion Starr’s jail cell, allowing a group of inmates who had been threatening to harm Starr to enter the cell. The inmates stabbed Starr twenty-three times. After the inmates left Starr’s cell, one deputy repeated yelled “shut up n­­­­—-” while kicking Starr. Other deputies stood by and watched. Starr sued not only the deputies involved in the attack, but also sued Sheriff Baca. The complaint alleged that based upon a series of previous incidents, the sheriff knew or should have known about the dangers in the county jail, but failed to act to prevent them. The district court dismissed the claim against Sheriff Baca. The court reasoned that the complaint did not allege that the sheriff participated in the incident giving rise to Starr’s injuries; was involved in any review or investigation of that incident; or implemented a specific policy that caused the violation. The court of appeals reversed the dismissal of the claim against the sheriff. The court held that “unlike a claim of unconstitutional discrimination,” plaintiff’s claim that conditions of confinement violated the Eighth Amendment “may be based on a theory of deliberate indifference.” Id. at 1206. Accordingly, “[a] showing that the supervisor … failed to act … is sufficient to demonstrate the involvement—and the liability—of that supervisor.” Id. at 1206-07.
      3. In Sash v. United States, 674 F. Supp.2d 531 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), plaintiff alleged that the supervisor was liable for failing to properly train and supervise the police officers who used excessive force while arresting the plaintiff. The court noted that the Iqbal Court “specifically held that ‘[t]he factors necessary to establish’” supervisory liability “‘will vary with the constitutional provision at issue.’” Id. at 544. The court then reasoned that the inaction of the supervisor may give rise to liability ‘[w]here the constitutional claim does not require a showing of discriminatory intent, but instead relies on the unreasonable conduct or deliberate indifference standard of the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. Id. See also, D’Olimpio v. Crisafi, 718 F. Supp.2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Because proof of Fourth Amendment violation does not require showing of discriminatory purpose, supervisor may be held liable for failing to take action in response to notice of wrongdoing by subordinate officers in making arrests).
6. If plaintiff satisfies both the Iqbal mandate that the supervisor violated the Constitution and the Rizzo requirement of an “affirmative link” between the supervisor’s conduct and the constitutional deprivation, must the plaintiff further prove that the supervisor’s unconstitutional action was a cause in fact of the invasion of plaintiff’s rights?
   1. Courts generally have insisted plaintiff prove that the supervisor’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of the violation. Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 114 (2d Cir. 2020) (“To succeed on a supervisory liability claim, a plaintiff must “show an affirmative causal link between the supervisor’s inaction and [the plaintiff’s] injury.”); Keith v. Dekalb County, 749 F.3d 1034, 1052 (11th Cir. 2014) (to hold supervisor liable for failure to properly train subordinates, plaintiff must prove that “the failure has actually caused the injury of which plaintiff complains.”). However, they have adopted a range of standards of causation.
   2. The most stringent articulation of the causation element requires the plaintiff to show that the “supervisor’s conduct led inexorably to the constitutional violation.” Maldonado v. Fontanes, 568 F.3d 263, 275 (1st Cir. 2009). See also Walker v. Upshaw (In re Estate of Walker), 515 Fed. Appx. 334, 340 (5th Cir 2013) (“when plaintiffs allege that a supervisory official failed to train or supervise they must prove that … the inadequacy of the training [was] obviously likely to result a constitutional violation.”).
   3. Some courts have concluded that to hold a supervisor liable, plaintiff has to show that the supervisor’s conduct was “closely related” to the constitutional violation that occurred. Burke v. New Mexico, 696 Fed. Appx. 325 (10th Cir. 2017) (affirming judgment for supervisory official where plaintiff “alleged no specific deficiency in [the defendant’s training] that was closely related to her ultimate injury and ‘actually caused’ unequal treatment.’”); Parrish v. Ball, 594 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2010). See also Doe v. Durham Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12249 at *45 (No. 1:17cv773 (M.D. N.C. January 25, 2019) (“After showing deliberate indifference, plaintiffs must show a ‘sufficiently close causal link’ between the training deficiency and the alleged violation—that the violation was ‘almost bound to happen”)
   4. Other courts have ruled that the requisite causal connection exists where the supervisor’s actions “could be reasonably expected to give rise to just the sort of injuries that occurred.” Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F. 3d 233, 245 (6th Cir. 2016); Vazquez v. Cty. of Kern, 949 F.3d 1153, 1166 (9th Cir. 2020) (“‘The requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict constitutional harms’”); Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1211 (10th Cir. 2010) (supervisor liable if he “set in motion a series of events that the [supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights.”); Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir. 2011).
   5. Yet other courts simply have required the plaintiff to show “some” causal connection between the supervisor’s actions and the constitutional violation. Sanchez v. Pereira v. Castillo, 590 F.3d 31, 49 (1st Cir. 2009); Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009).
7. If plaintiff must prove the supervisor’s conduct was a cause in fact of the constitutional deprivation, did Iqbal supplant the “affirmative link” requirement set forth in Rizzo v. Goode? See Santiago v. Warminster Township, 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Particularly after Iqbal, the connection between the supervisor’s directions and the constitutional deprivation must be sufficient to ‘demonstrate a ‘plausible nexus’ or ‘affirmative link’ between the [directions] and the specific deprivation of constitutional rights at issue.’”) (emphasis supplied).; Clark v. Sheffield, 807 Fed. Appx. 910, 917 (11th Cir. 2020) (”Supervisory liability occurs only when the supervisor personally participates in the alleged violation or when there is a causal connection between the supervisory official’s actions and the alleged deprivation.”’) (emphasis supplied).

MARTINEZ v. CALIFORNIA, 444 U.S. 277 (1980)

Mr. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.

[1]The two federal questions that appellants ask us to decide are (1) whether the Fourteenth Amendment invalidates a California statute granting absolute immunity to public employees who make parole-release determinations, and (2) whether such officials are absolutely immune from liability in an action brought under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We agree with the California Court of Appeal that the state statute is valid when applied to claims arising under state law, and we conclude that appellants have not alleged a claim for relief under federal law.

[2]The case arises out of the murder of a 15-year-old girl by a parolee. Her survivors brought this action in a California court claiming that the state officials responsible for the parole-release decision are liable in damages for the harm caused by the parolee.

[3]The complaint alleged that the parolee, one Thomas, was convicted of attempted rape in December 1969. He was first committed to a state mental hospital as a “Mentally Disordered Sex Offender not amenable to treatment” and thereafter sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 1 to 20 years, with a recommendation that he not be paroled. Nevertheless, five years later, appellees decided to parole Thomas to the care of his mother. They were fully informed about his history, his propensities, and the likelihood that he would commit another violent crime. Moreover, in making their release determination they failed to observe certain “requisite formalities.” Five months after his release Thomas tortured and killed appellants’ decedent. We assume, as the complaint alleges, that appellees knew, or should have known, that the release of Thomas created a clear and present danger that such an incident would occur. Their action is characterized not only as negligent, but also as reckless, willful, wanton and malicious. Appellants prayed for actual and punitive damages of $2 million.

[4]The trial judge sustained a demurrer to the complaint and his order was upheld on appeal. 85 Cal. App.3d 430, 149 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1978). After the California Supreme Court denied appellants’ petition for a hearing, we noted probable jurisdiction. 441 U.S. 960.

* * * * *

II

[5]We turn then to appellants’ § 1983 claim that appellees, by their action in releasing Thomas, subjected appellants’ decedent to a deprivation of her life without due process of law.^[6]
It is clear that the California immunity statute does not control this claim even though the federal cause of action is being asserted in the state courts.^[7] We also conclude that it is not necessary for us to decide any question concerning the immunity of state parole officials as a matter of federal law because, as we recently held in Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, “[the] first inquiry in any § 1983 suit … is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws'” of the United States. The answer to that inquiry disposes of this case.

[6]Appellants contend that the decedent’s right to life is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. But the Fourteenth Amendment protected her only from deprivation by the “State … of life … without due process of law.” Although the decision to release Thomas from prison was action by the State, the action of Thomas five months later cannot be fairly characterized as state action. Regardless of whether, as a matter of state tort law, the parole board could be said either to have had a “duty” to avoid harm to his victim or to have proximately caused her death, see Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d 1227 (1977); Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928), we hold that, taking these particular allegations as true, appellees did not “deprive” appellants’ decedent of life within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.

[7]Her life was taken by the parolee five months after his release.^[8]

He was in no sense an agent of the parole board. Cf. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232. Further, the parole board was not aware that appellants’ decedent, as distinguished from the public at large, faced any special danger. We need not and do not decide that a parole officer could never be deemed to “deprive” someone of life by action taken in connection with the release of a prisoner on parole. But we do hold that at least under the particular circumstances of this parole decision, appellants’ decedent’s death is too remote a consequence of the parole officers’ action to hold them responsible under the federal civil rights law. Although a § 1983 claim has been described as “a species of tort liability,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417, it is perfectly clear that not every injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable under that statute.

The judgment is affirmed. So ordered.

Martinez v. California – Audio and Transcript of Oral Argument

Footnotes

6. We note that the California courts accepted jurisdiction of this federal claim. That exercise of jurisdiction appears to be consistent with the general rule that where “‘an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a State court.'” Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391, quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137. See also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 36, n.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 281 U.S. 470, 476. We have never considered, however, the question whether a State must entertain a claim under § 1983. We note that where the same type of claim, if arising under state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state courts are generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim. Testa v. Katt, supra, at 394. But see Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25, 442 S.W.2d 248 (1969). ↵

    

7. “Conduct by persons acting under color of state law which is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or § 1985 (3) cannot be immunized by state law. A construction of the federal statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures that the proper construction may be enforced. See McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1968). The immunity claim raises a question of federal law.” Hampton v. Chicago, 484 F.2d 602, 607 (CA7 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917. ↵

    

8. Compare the facts in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, where local law enforcement officials themselves beat a citizen to death ↵

    

Notes on Martinez v. California: Causation and Duty

1. Did the Court decide Martinez on the issue of causation? Was the parole board’s decision to release Thomas a cause in fact of the murder?  Would the outcome have been different if the murder had occurred five hours after Thomas was released from custody? Would the parole officials be liable if they knew the Martinez’s daughter was Thomas’ intended victim?
2. In Taggart v. State of Washington, 822 P.2d 243 (Wash. 1992), Victoria Taggart brought state tort claims against the State of Washington and its agents for negligently supervising parolee Louis Brock, who assaulted Taggart seven months after his release. Taggart and Brock had not met before the assault. The Washington Supreme Court, reversing the trial court’s grant of defendant’s motion for summary judgment, rejected the State’s argument that the parole officials’ actions were not a legal cause of assault.The State argues that Brock’s assault on Taggart occurred “without any warning to responsible correctional officials.” … The State contends that since the state correctional system does not have the resources to monitor parolees constantly in order to prevent them from committing unpredictable crimes, neither the State nor its agents should be deemed the legal cause of Taggart’s injuries.
   

   We disagree.  Brock had a long history of violent attacks against women and a consistently unfavorable prognosis for recovery from his psychiatric problems.  In light of such facts, the assertion that Brock’s assault upon yet another woman occurred without warning is not that … her actions to protect against Brock’s dangerous propensities were reasonable under the circumstances, so that she did not breach any duty.  We are unwilling to declare as a matter of law that no actions of the State or its agents were the legal cause of Taggart’s injuries.

   Taggart, 822 P.2d at 258-59.

3. The Martinez Court noted that the parole board did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment “[r]egardless of whether, as a matter of state tort law, the parole board could be said to either have had a ‘duty’ to avoid harm to his victim or to have proximately caused her death.” Martinez at 285. Under what circumstances would an official’s actions be a proximate cause of the victim’s injury under state tort law yet not be a cause of the injury for purposes of an action under Section 1983?
   1. “Just as basis of liability concepts of tort law do not determine §1983 basis of liability requirements, proximate cause standards from tort law should not be dispositive of the § 1983 extent of liability question. This is not to say, of course, that proximate cause standards from tort law are not useful.  It turns out, in fact, that most circuits use a reasonable foreseeability standard adapted from tort law.  The point, though, is that tort law purposes and interests are often different from § 1983 purposes and interests, and thus tort law concepts should not be blindly applied.” See Sheldon Nahmod, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Litigation (4th ed. 2000) § 3.104
   2. In Barnes v. Anderson, 202 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 1999), Michelle Barnes alleged that courtroom security officers caused her to miscarry by using excessive force in the course of an unconstitutional arrest. Because no expert witness had testified that defendants’ actions had inflicted sufficient trauma to cause Mrs. Barnes to miscarry, the district court instructed the jury that it was not to consider the miscarriage on the issue of damages.The court of appeals affirmed:
      

      Although proximate causation in the § 1983 context is a question of federal law, in determining the meaning of the concept we look to those state tort analogs, because the “‘Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that principles of causation borrowed from tort law are relevant to civil rights actions brought under § 1983.’” [citations omitted]

      In this instance, the district court concluded that proof of proximate cause of a miscarriage required expert medical evidence specifically attributing that injury to the acts of which the plaintiff complained. We find this to be entirely consistent with analogous tort law doctrine.

      Barnes, 202 F.3d at 158-59.  See also Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1168 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Although § 1983 addresses only constitutional torts, § 1983 defendants are, as in common law tort suits, responsible for the natural and foreseeable consequences of their actions….  For damages to be proximately caused by a constitutional tort, a plaintiff must show that, except for that constitutional tort, such injuries and damages would not have occurred and further that such injuries were the reasonable foreseeable consequences of the tortious acts or omissions in Issue”).

   3. The lower federal courts have looked to state law in determining whether a supervisory official was personally involved in a constitutional violation under the “affirmative link” requirement of Rizzo v. Goode. See Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1528 (10th Cir. 1988) (“Unless a supervisor has established or utilized an unconstitutional policy or custom, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory defendant breached a duty imposed by state or local law which caused the violation”); Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir. 1984), (“The outer limits of liability in any given case are determined ultimately by pinpointing the persons in the decisionmaking chain whose deliberate indifference permitted the constitutional abuses to continue unchecked.  The final determination ‘generally is one of fact, not law’ … but state statutes fixing the administrator’s legal duties provide a useful guide in determining who had the responsibility and capability to end the offensive practices.”). The propriety of using state law to assign responsibility for constitutional invasions also arises in the Supreme Court’s attempt to define municipal liability.  See Chapter IV, infra.
4. Francois Daniel Lesage, an African immigrant of Caucasian descent, brought a Section 1983 action for race discrimination following rejection of his application for admission to the Ph.D. program in counseling psychology at the University of Texas. It was undisputed that the University considered race of the applicant in its review process.  Finding that the undisputed facts established that Lesage would have been rejected even if the admissions process had been entirely color blind, the District Court entered summary judgment for the University.  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding the determination of whether Lesage would have been admitted irrelevant to whether the University had violated his constitutional rights.
   The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals:

   [E]ven if the government has considered an impermissible criterion in making a decision adverse to the plaintiff, it can nonetheless defeat liability by demonstrating that it would have made the same decision absent the forbidden consideration [citations omitted]. Our previous decisions on this point have typically involved retaliation for protected First Amendment activity more than racial discrimination, but that distinction is immaterial. The underlying principle is the same … Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting relief under § 1983.

   Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1999).

5. In County of Los Angeles v. Mendez, 137 S. Ct. 1539 (2017) Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department Deputies were executing an arrest warrant for Ronnie O’Dell. The deputies entered a one-room shack where Angel Mendez and Jennifer Garcia were living.  The deputies did not have a search warrant and did not knock and announce their presence.  The deputies opened the door to the shack and pulled back the blanket on the futon where Mendez and Garcia were napping.  Mendez thought it was the owner of the home in whose backyard they were living who had entered.  Mendez picked up the BB gun he used to kill rats so that he could stand up and place the gun on the floor.  The deputies, believing the gun was a small caliber rifle, fired 15 rounds, shooting both Garcia and Mendez multiple times.  As a result of the shooting, Mendez’s leg had to be amputated below the knee.

   Mendez and Garcia brought a Section 1983 claim alleging three separate constitutional violations:  First, that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the shack without a warrant; second, that the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to knock and announce their presence; and third, that the deputies engaged in an unreasonable seizure by using excessive force.

   Following a bench trial, the District Court found in favor of plaintiffs on the warrantless entry and knock and announce claims.  However, the court awarded only nominal damage on these counts, reasoning that Mendez’s picking up the BB gun was a superseding cause as to damages that flowed from the shooting.  As to the excessive force claim, the court first found that the deputies’ use of force was reasonable in light of their belief that Mendez posed a threat to their lives by holding what they believed to be a rifle.  The court then applied the Ninth Circuit’s “provocation rule,” under which an otherwise reasonable use of force is unreasonable as a matter of law where the officer intentionally or recklessly provoked the violent response and that provocation is an independent violation of the constitution.  The court found the deputies liable under the provocation rule and awarded Mendez and Garcia approximately four million dollars in damages.

   While not disagreeing with the district court that the shooting was reasonable, the court of appeals affirmed the judgment for plaintiffs on the excessive force claim because the deputies had intentionally and recklessly caused the shooting by entering the shack without a warrant.  As an alternative ground for affirmance, the court of appeals reasoned that as a matter of proximate cause, it was reasonably foreseeable that the officers would encounter an armed homeowner by entering the shack unannounced.

   The United States Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the provocation rule impermissibly imposes liability for constitutionally reasonable force by linking the use of force to an earlier-in-time, different violation of the Constitution:

   [T]he [provocation] rule includes a vague causal standard. It applies when a prior constitutional violation ‘created a situation which led to’ the use of force.  The rule does not incorporate the familiar proximate cause standard. Indeed, it is not clear what causal standard is being applied.

   Mendez, 137 S. Ct. at 1548.

   The Court further held that the court of appeals erred in its alternative ruling that the warrantless entry was a proximate cause of the shooting:

   Proper analysis of this proximate cause question required consideration of the “foreseeability or scope of the risk created by the predicate conduct,” and required the court to conclude that that there was “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.” …

   [T]he Court of Appeals did not identify the foreseeable risks associated with the relevant constitutional violation (the warrantless entry); nor did it explain how, on these facts, respondent’s injuries were proximately caused by the warrantless entry.  In other words, the Court of Appeals’ proximate cause analysis, like the provocation rule, conflated distinct Fourth Amendment claims and required only a murky causal link between the warrantless entry and the injuries attributed to it.  On remand, the court should revisit the question whether proximate cause permits respondents to recover damages for their shooting injuries based on the deputies’ failure to secure a warrant at the outset.